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This Comment argues that prior international treaties protecting cultural property should be
used as a guide to settle the dispute between Russia and Germany as to which is the rightful owner
of cultural property looted during World War II. Part I of this Comment examines the more recent
developments in the international protection of cultural property up to the International Institute
for the Unification of Private Law’s Final Act of the Diplomatic Convention on the International
Return of Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects of 1995 (”UNIDROIT Convention”). Part
II discusses the evolution of the present conflict between the Russian and German Governments
regarding ownership of cultural property taken during World War II. Part III of this Comment
argues that the UNIDROIT Convention should be applied to the cultural property stolen during
WWII and used as a guide to arriving at an equitable solution. This Comment concludes that the
cultural property originally stolen by the Nazis during World War II that is presently in Russian
museums should be returned to the German Government or its other original owners.
COMMENT
PROTECTING CULTURAL PROPERTY DURING A TIME OF




"'Ah dear boy, since you call back such memories,
such living hell we endured in distant Troy-
we headstrong fighting forces of Achaea-
so many raids from shipboard down the foggy sea,
cruising for plunder, wherever Achilles led the way'
Homer, The Odyssey1
Since the dawn of civilization, powerful nations have plun-
dered and pillaged whatever cultural property2 they could carry
from the nations that they conquered.3 The history of cultural
looting dates back to the Roman Empire in 400 B.C.4 The Ro-
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1. HOMER, 3 THE ODYSSEY 110, In. 114 (Robert Fagles trans., 1996). Homer de-
scribes the plunder that was common in ancient times as King Nestor recounts the sack
of Troy to Telemachus. Id.
2. See Stephanie 0. Forbes, Securing the Future of Our Past: Current Efforts to Protect
Cultural Property, 9 TRANSNAT'L LAw. 235, 239 (1996) (discussing various conflicts be-
tween definitions of cultural property). There is a lack of uniformity when it comes to
defining cultural property. Id.; see also Paul M. Bator, An Essay on the International Trade
in Art, 34 STAN. L. REv. 275, 284-85 (1982) (explaining problem of defining cultural
property as preliminary matter). As Paul Bator notes, "I will ignore these technicalities
and will use the term 'work of art' or 'art treasure' loosely to include all objects that are
in fact prized and collected, whether or not they were originally designed to be useful,
and whether or not they possess 'scientific' as well as aesthetic value." Bator, supra, at
285.
3. LEONARD D. DuBoFF & SALLY HOLT CAPLAN, THE DESKBOOK OF ART LAW, SECOND
EDrrION: BOOKLET D D-3 (1996) [hereinafter DUBOFF, DESKBOOK].
4. Id.; see HOMER, supra note 1, at 77, In. 1 (telling story of Odysseus's travels).
Homer explains: "Sing to me of the man, Muse, the man of twists and turns/driven
time and again off course, once he had plundered/the hallowed heights of Troy." Id.
See also LEONARD D. DuBoFF, ART LAw IN A NUTSHELL, SECOND EDITION 30 (1993) [here-
inafter DuBoFF, NUTSHELL] (explaining historical examples of armies' looting). The
first sentence in THE ODYSSEY references the common occurrence of plunder in ancient
times. Id.
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mans did not display their loot for its artistic value, but rather to
demonstrate the prowess of their own victories.5 After the fall of
the Roman Empire,6 the resulting political chaos increased the
destruction of cultural property.7 From the Crusades8 and the
Spanish search for gold,9 to the European Thirty Years' War a"
and the French Revolution," armies continually ransacked cul-
tural property. 12 The Nazis' reign during World War II also in-
volved the plunder of cultural property.1 3 The Nazis seized art
from conquered nations as a symbol of their strength. 14 Any art
that did not fit their vision of the superior Aryan race the Nazis
deemed degenerate and destroyed.1 5
The United States first attempted to set limits on wartime
5. DuBOFF, DESKBOOK, supra note 3, at D-3.
6. BERNARD GRUN, THE TIMETABLES OF HISTORY 28 (3d ed. 1991). The Roman Em-
pire effectively ended in 285 A.D. when it split into eastern and western halves. Id.
7. See DuBorF, DESKBOOK, supra note 3, at D-4 (discussing history of cultural de-
struction caused by war). Although the immediate power struggles that followed the
fall of Rome resulted in a high mortality rate for artifacts, such cultural destruction
usually resulted from negligence and mishandling. Id.
8. Id. The Crusades of the early thirteenth century were the first systematic plun-
der of cultural property. Id. The soldiers of the Crusades quickly developed an unre-
lenting thirst for spoils. Id.
9. Id. at D-5. During the Middle Ages, Spanish explorers set off to discover riches
in gold. Id. Most of the ensuing conquered nations made their religious and cultural
objects out of gold. Id. In the explorers' zeal for riches in gold, these cultural objects
were destroyed to create new Spanish gold coins. Id.
10. GRUN, supra note 6, at 276-294. During the period of 1618-1648, German Prot-
estant princes and foreign powers, such as Sweden and France, battled the House of
Hapsburg and its allies. Id. at 284-86. The apogee of the Thirty Years' War was the fall
of Prague. DuBOFF, DESKBOOK, supra note 3, at D-6. The Queen of Sweden com-
manded her army to transport all of the cultural property previously confiscated back to
Stockholm. Id. The Swedes took countless treasured art objects of the German Repub-
lic from their resting places in efforts to appease the Queen. Id.
11. DuBOFF, DESKBOOK, supra note 3, at D-6. At the time of the French Revolution,
in 1789, the masses of France viewed private property as "a symbol of the hated aristoc-
racy." Id. Mobs of angry French citizens raided grand palaces, such as Versailles. Id.
Some of this loot ended up in Paris, but countless objects disappeared forever. Id.
12. Id. at D-3-D-8.
13. DuBOFF, NUTSHELL, supra note 4, at 30.
14. Id.; see LYNN H. NICHOLAS, THE RAPE OF EUROPA: THE FATE OF EUROPE'S
TREASURES IN THE THIRD REICH AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR 10-11 (1995) (discussing
seizure and destruction of cultural property during World War II). The Nazi's seized
artwork in their attempt to create a super museum designed to reflect Hitler's personal
tastes and at the same time glorify Hitler's views of the superior Aryan race. NICHOLAS,
supra, at 10-11.
15. See NICHOLAS, supra note 14, at 10-25 (discussing Nazi's methods for eliminat-
ing degenerate art and artists from Germany).
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ravages of cultural property in the Lieber Code of 1863.16 More-
over, the Hague Conventions of 189917 and 190718 established
the first formal international guidelines for the protection of cul-
tural property during war.19 Despite these safeguards, the ad-
vances in technology that led to World War I also launched the
destruction of cultural property.20 It was not until after World
War II that the international community took further steps to
protect cultural property.2 1 Today conquering nations do not
generally pillage cultural property.2
This Comment argues that prior international treaties pro-
tecting cultural property should be used as a guide to settle the
dispute between Russia2" and Germany as to which is the rightful
16. See RICHARD SHELLY HARTIGAN, LIEBER'S CODE AND THE LAw OF WAR 1 (1983)
(discussing revolutionary ideas in Lieber Code). The Lieber Code of 1863 was a set of
U.S. Army field regulations to set codes of conduct during war. HARTIGAN, supra, at 1.
The Lieber Code was one of the earliest documents to recognize the need for protec-
tion of cultural property during war. Id. at 16-17. See also DuBorr, DESKBOOK, supra
note 3, at D-9 (explaining early attempts at protecting cultural property).
17. Convention with Certain Powers on the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803.
18. Convention with Other Powers on the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct.
18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277 [hereinafter Convention on the Laws of War].
19. See DuBoFF, DESKBOOV, supra note 3, at D-10-D-1 I (explaining Hague Conven-
tion's early attempts to protect cultural property). The guidelines of the Hague Con-
ventions of 1899 and 1907 include a general rule prohibiting the confiscation of private
property and a rule imposing legal proceedings on any destruction, damage, or confis-
cation of private property. Convention on the Laws of War, supra note 18, arts. 46 and
56, 36 Stat. at 2306-07, 2309. All of the major political powers signed the two conven-
tions. DuBorr, DESKBOOK, supra note 3, at D-10-D-11. In practice, however, the conven-
tions proved ineffectual. Id.
20. See DuBorr, DESKBOOK, supra note 3, at D-1 1 (explaining that introduction of
mechanized war machines made distinction between legitimate and illegitimate meth-
ods of combat difficult to discern).
21. See Forbes, supra note 2, at 244 (reasoning that "[t]he Hague Convention was
the first significant international agreement dedicated solely to the protection of cul-
tural property."); see also Lisa J. Borodkin, The Economics of Antiquities Looting and a Pro-
posed Legal Alternative, 95 COLVM. L. REv. 377, 388 (1995) (stating that Hague Conven-
tion was "first international agreement to protect art").
22. See Claudia Fox, Notes and Comments, The UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or
Illegally Exported Cultural Objects: An Answer to the World Problem of Illicit Trade in Cultural
Property, 9 Am. U.J. IN'r'L. L. & POLY 225, 246 (1993) (discussing current international
laws protecting cultural property). The protection of cultural property began in six-
teenth century Europe. Id. Countries did not begin to respect these first efforts to
protect cultural property, however, until the mid-eighteenth century. Id. Cultural
property really gained protection when countries embodied laws protecting cultural
property into international legislation at the beginning of the twentieth century. Id.
23. See George Bunn & John B. Rhinelander, The Arms Control Obligations of the
Former Soviet Union, 33 VA. J. Iwr'L L. 323, 323-25 (1993) (noting breakup of Soviet
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owner of cultural property looted during World War II. Part I of
this Comment examines the more recent developments in the
international protection of cultural property up to the Interna-
tional Institute for the Unification of Private Law's Final Act of
the Diplomatic Convention on the International Return of Sto-
len or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects of 19954
("UNIDROIT Convention"). Part II discusses the evolution of
the present conflict between the Russian and German Govern-
ments regarding ownership of cultural property taken during
World War II. Part III of this Comment argues that the
UNIDROIT Convention should be applied to the cultural prop-
erty stolen during WWII and used as a guide to arriving at an
equitable solution. This Comment concludes that the cultural
property originally stolen by the Nazis during World War II that
is presently in Russian museums should be returned to the Ger-
man Government or its other original owners.
I. THE DEFINITION, IMPORTANCE, PROBLEMS, AND
PROTECTIONS OF CULTURAL PROPERTY
In the past, the spoils of war belonged to the victors. 5 Na-
poleon plundered cultural objects throughout his campaigns to
conquer the world.2 6 In the twentieth century, during World
Union into fifteen independent republics, one of which is Russia). Prior to the
breakup of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union was also commonly referred to as Russia.
See Viktor Knapp, Socialist Federalism -A Legal Means to the Solution of the Nationality Prob-
lem: A Comparative Study, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1213, 1214 (1984) (using Soviet Union and
Russia interchangeably). In the context of this Comment, the former Soviet Union was
responsible for the confiscation of cultural property during World War II, while the
newly created Russian Government is involved in the present dispute over ownership.
See Bunn & Rhinelander, supra, at 325 (stating breakup of Soviet Union resulted in
independent republic called Russia).
24. International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT): Final
Act of the Diplomatic Conference for the Adoption of the Draft UNIDROIT Conven-
tion on the International Return of Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, June
24, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 1322 (1995) [hereinafter UNIDROIT Convention].
25. See David Mazie, Spoils of War Display of Art Seized in Battle Sparks Debate, CHI.
T~ia., Feb. 19, 1995, at 21 (describing conflict between Russian and German Govern-
ments as to which rightfully owns cultural property looted during World War II). His-
torically, the victors in battles would return to their countries with art treasures to sig-
nify the glory of their country. Id.
26. INTERNATIONAL INSTrrUTE FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAw, DIPLOMATIC
CONFERENCE FOR THE ADOPTION OF THE DRAFT UNIDROIT CONVENTION ON THE INTER-
NATIONAL RETURN OF STOLEN OR ILLEGALLY EXPORTED CULTURAL OBJECTS, ACTs AND
PROCEEDINGS 21 (1995) [hereinafter Explanatory Report].
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War II, the Nazis stole 2 7 rerouted, 28 and destroyed 9 countless
cultural objects.3" Recent history, however, shows some progress
by the art world towards protecting cultural property.3 "
A. The Nature of Cultural Property
There are two immediate problems to consider when dis-
cussing the international protection of cultural property.3 2 The
first difficulty lies with defining what is meant by the term cul-
tural property.33 The second hurdle involves explaining why cul-
tural property is important enough to warrant protection.34
27. NICHoLAs, supra note 14, at 38-40. The Nazis launched an extensive campaign
of anti-Semitism which included looting Jewish cultural property. Id. at 38. Jews who
managed to escape Nazi occupied countries like Austria had to abandon most of their
possessions. Id. at 39. The Nazis forced Jews who remained in occupied countries to
register all of their possessions with the Nazis. Id. This registration system provided a
near perfect accounting of the identity and location of cultural property available for
the Nazis to confiscate. Id.
28. See id. at 38-41 (explaining howJews who fled Austria and shipped their posses-
sions afterwards risked possibility of customs officers ripping open their packages and
confiscating anything that seemed valuable); see alsoJo Ann Lewis, The Art Sleuths Who
Struck Gold; Two Muscovites Uncover Treasures Hitler Stole and the Russians Hid, WASH. PosT,
Jan. 20, 1995, at D1 (discussing how looting of art during World War II was most system-
atic and extensive campaign ever seen).
29. SeeJamey Gambrell, Displaced Art, ART IN Am., Sept. 1, 1995, at 88 (describing
Nazi's destruction of cultural property as "so massive as to be inconceivable"); KONSTAN-
TIN AKINSHA AND GIuGOR KOZLOV, BEAUTIFUL LOOT: THE SOVIET PLUNDER OF EUROPE'S
ART TREASURES (1995) (detailing Russia's World War II plunder of cultural objects and
how world learned of Russia's secret cache of cultural objects).
30. See HECTOR FELICIANO, THE LOST MUSEUM - THE NAZI CONSPIRACY TO STEAL THE
WORLD'S GREATEST WoRKS OF ART 16 (Tim Bent & Hector Feliciano trans., BasicBooks
2d ed. 1997) (1995) (discussing how Hitler's interest in art led to one of greatest dis-
placements of cultural property). In a period of five years, the Nazis displaced hun-
dreds of thousands of cultural objects from across Europe. Id.
31. Forbes, supra note 2, at 246. The 1995 UNIDROIT Convention is the most
recent development in the international attempt to fight illegal trafficking of cultural
property. Id.
32. See SHARON A. WILLIAMS, THE INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL PROTECTION OF
MOVABLE CULTURAL PROPERY. A COMPARATIVE STUDY 1 (1978) (introducing problems
with protection of cultural property by explaining why it is important and what it com-
prises).
33. See Forbes, supra note 2, at 239-40 (discussing problems with defining cultural
property as background to international cultural property protection).
34. Id. at 241-43. There are different reasons why cultural property is important.
Id. at 241. One viewpoint looks at protection of cultural property from a national per-
spective. Id. at 242. This viewpoint looks at cultural property as part of a nation's cul-
tural heritage in that it gives specific nations, as opposed to the international commu-
nity at large, an identity. Id. The other perspective looks at the protection of cultural
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1. Cultural Property Defined
The main problem facing international protection of cul-
tural property is answering the threshold question of what ob-
jects constitute cultural property.35 Depending upon the coun-
try or international agreement, the definition of cultural prop-
erty varies greatly.36 A general definition, however, would
property on an international level. Id. at 243. According to this view, the protection of
cultural property is a global interest. Id.
35. See Spencer A. Kinderman, Comment, The UNIIROIT Draft Convention on Cul-
tural Objects: An Examination of the Need for a Uniform Legal Framework for Controlling the
Illicit Movement of Cultural Property, 7 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 457, 465 (1993) (explaining
need to define cultural property before analyzing laws regarding cultural property).
One problem with protecting cultural property is that cultural property cannot be de-
fined solely by objective terms. Id. at 466. The committee charged with drafting a
definition of cultural property for the UNIDROIT Convention ultimately decided to
use both an enumerative and an exhaustive approach. Explanatory Report, supra note
26, at 24 (explaining discussions of participating countries regarding definition of cul-
tural property). The definition sets a general limitation as to what situations the
UNIDROIT Convention may apply to in the future. Id. The UNIDROIT Convention
then proceeds to set out specific examples of cultural property. Id.
36. See Roger W. Mastalir, A Proposalfor Protecting the "Cultural" and "Property"Aspects
of Cultural Property Under International Law, 16 FORDHAm INT'L LJ. 1033, 1040 (1993)
(discussing accepted definition of cultural property). The 1970 UNESCO Convention
on the Means of Prohibiting the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of
Cultural Property is widely accepted as providing a workable definition of cultural prop-
erty. Id.; see The 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Prevent-
ing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14,
1970, art. 1, 823 U.N.T.S. 231, 234-36, 10 I.L.M. 289, 289-90 [hereinafter UNESCO Con-
vention] (defining what is meant by term cultural property). This definition, however,
leaves the duty of designating specific items as cultural property to member states. Mas-
talir, supra, at 1040. The definition provided by the UNESCO Convention defines cul-
tural property as:
[P]roperty which, on religious or secular grounds, is specifically designated by
each State as being of importance for archaeology, prehistory, history, litera-
ture, art or science and which belongs to the following categories:
(a) rare collections and specimens of fauna, flora, minerals and anatomy, and
objects of paleontological interest;
(b) property relating to history, including the history of science and technol-
ogy and military and social history, to the life of national leaders, thinkers,
scientists and artists and to events of national importance;
(c) products of archaeological excavations (including regular and clandes-
tine) or of archaeological discoveries;
(d) elements of artistic or historical monuments or archaeological sites which
have been dismembered;
(e) antiquities more than one hundred years old, such as inscriptions, coins
and engraved seals;
(f) objects of ethnological interest;
(g) property of artistic interest, such as:
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include art, artifacts, antiques, significant architecture, artificial
landscapes, religious objects and sites, and native peoples' ob-
jects. 37 Although this list is not exhaustive, it is broad enough to
cover most objects that could be considered cultural property.3 8
2. Importance of Cultural Property
Cultural property is unique in that once cultural property is
destroyed or stolen it cannot be replaced. 9 Cultural property is
important because it offers scholars unique insight into the
minds of the people and the nations who created the cultural
objects.40 Furthermore, protecting these original cultural ob-
jects assists historians in understanding the past.41 Beyond these
intellectual and educational reasons, cultural property enhances
a country's sense of its present and future.42 For some people,
cultural property can be a reminder of the creativity of the
(i) pictures, paintings and drawings produced entirely by hand on any support
and in any material (excluding industrial designs and manufactured articles
decorated by hand);
(ii) original works of statuary art and sculpture in any material;
(iii) original engravings, prints and lithographs;
(iv) original artistic assemblages and montages in any material;
(h) rare manuscripts and icunabula, old books, documents and publications
of special interest (historic, artistic, scientific, literary, etc.) singly or in collec-
tions;
(i) postage, revenue and similar stamps, singly or in collections;
(j) archives, including sound, photographic and cinematographic archives;
(k) articles of furniture more than one hundred years old and old musical
instruments.
UNESCO Convention, supra, 823 U.N.T.S. at 234-36, 10 I.L.M. at 289-90.
37. See Forbes, supra note 2, at 239-40 (explaining variety of definitions for cultural
property due to lack of uniformity in laws protecting cultural property).
38. Id.
39. See 1 JOHN H. MERRYMAN & ALBERT E. EISEN, LAw, ETHICS, AND THE VISUAL
ARTs xvi (2d ed. 1987) (explaining that irreplaceable nature of cultural property justi-
fies its importance and proper protection).
40. See id. (explaining some reasons why people chose to study art).
41. Id.
42. Id.; see Forbes, supra note 2, at 241-42 (stating that cultural property enhances
every country's "quality of life, economy, and cultural environment"). Cultural prop-
erty helps a nation define its identity and origin. Forbes, supra, at 241-42; see Bator,
supra note 2, at 304 (discussing relevant values involved in protection of cultural prop-
erty). The existence of a common culture is closely tied with the awareness of a sense of
community. Bator, supra, at 304. Protecting cultural property fosters a community's
awareness of a common culture and helps people to remain aware of how each individ-
ual in a community is really intertwined. Id.
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past,43 or a symbol of quality,44 while for others it serves as an
inspiration to create new cultural objects. 45
B. The Laundering of Cultural Property
As the international market for cultural property expands,
so does the amount of illegal trade in cultural property.46 On an
international level the bona fide purchaser rule is one reason why
illegal traffic in cultural property remains so strong.4 7 The lex
locus situs rule is another reason why the illicit market in cultural
property continues to thrive.
1. Bona fide Purchaser Rule
Most European countries developed some measures for the
protection of cultural property.49 International protection of
43. See MERRYMAN & ELSEN, supra note 39, at xvi (explaining various reasons why
art is important to people).
44. Id.
45. Id. Often past creations can inspire contemporary artists to create new works.
Id.; see KIFLEJOTE, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROTECTION OF CULTURAL HERITAGE 19 (1994)
(emphasizing that cultural property must be protected so that future generations have
"information, knowledge and identity"); see also Bator, supra note 2, at 306 (examining
why cultural property should be protected). A country with a strong history of appreci-
ation for cultural property is attractive and inspirational to contemporary creators of
cultural property. Bator, supra, at 306.
46. See Borodkin, supra note 21, at 377 (discussing economic incentives for increas-
ing illegal art market).
47. See Robin Morris Collin, The Law and Stolen Art, Artifacts, and Antiquities, 36
How. L.J. 17, 21-22 (1993) (discussing common law and civil law differences in treat-
ment of personal property).
48. See Steven F. Grover, Note, The Need For Civil-Law Nations to Adopt Discovery Rules
in Art Replevin Actions: A Comparative Study, 70 TEx. L. REv. 1431, 1456 (1992) (discuss-
ing why abandonment of lex locus situs rule would create more protection for cultural
property).
49. See Kimberly A. Short, Note, Preventing the Theft and Illegal Export of Art in a
Europe Without Borders, 26 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 633, 650-55 (1993) (explaining differ-
ent national laws protecting cultural property). Most European Union countries have
some laws regulating the export and import of cultural property. Id. at 650. The most
common form of export control is screening regulations. Id. Screening regulations are
criteria implemented and used by a country when determining whether or not to ex-
port a certain piece of art. Id. Examples of screening regulation criteria include "age,
economic value, historic importance, and country of origin." Id. This screening pro-
cess fosters an open art market while at the same time discouraging illegal sales. Id.
Although embargoes are also forms of export control, in practice embargoes often
merely divert art to the black market. Id. In comparison to export regulations, fewer
countries have import regulations. Id. Import regulations usually involve the imposi-
tion of duties or even general prohibitions on importing illegally exported or stolen art.
Id.
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cultural property, however, is difficult to achieve through na-
tional legislation." ° On an international level, the basic differ-
ences between civil law"' and common law5 2 countries and how
each views a bona fide purchaser,5" complicates any international
protection of cultural property.
54
a. Divergent Treatment of the Bona Fide Purchaser
Common law dictates that a thief generally never transfers
property with good title.55 This principle derives from the Latin
50. See Karen Theresa Burke, Note, International Transfers of Stolen Cultural Property:
Should Thieves Continue to Benefit From Domestic Laws Favoring Bona Fide Purchasers?, 13
Loy. LA. INT'L & COMP. LJ. 427, 440 (1990) (discussing problems and loopholes in
international protection of cultural property).
51. See Short, supra note 49, at 637 (explaining reasons why differing laws protect-
ing cultural property cause problems on international level). Most Western European
nations follow a civil code. Id.; see BLACK'S LAW DiCrIoNARY 246 (6th ed. 1990) (defin-
ing civil law as "[t] hat body of law which every particular nation, commonwealth, or city
has established peculiarly for itself; more properly called 'municipal law'. . . . [T]he
system ofjurisprudence held and administered in the Roman empire, particularly as set
forth in the compilation ofJustinian and his successors").
52. See Monique Olivier, Comment, The UNIDROIT Convention: Attempting to Regu-
late the International Trade and Traffic of Cultural Property, 26 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 627,
637 (1996) (discussing differences between common law and civil law countries). Com-
mon law jurisdictions include the United States and the United Kingdom. Id.; see
BLACK'S LAw DIcrIoNaRv 276 (6th ed. 1990) (explaining that common law "com-
promises the body of those principles and rules of action, relating to the government
and security of persons and property, which derive their authority solely from usages
and customs of immemorial antiquity, or from the judgements and decrees of the
courts recognizing, affirming, and enforcing such usages and customs").
53. See BLACK'S LAw DIC'nONARY 177 (6th ed. 1990) (defining bona fide purchaser
as "[o]ne who has purchased property for value without any notice of any defects in the
title of the seller"); Grover, supra note 48, at 1445 (explaining that growing consensus
among commentators is that lack of uniformity in national laws increases amount of
cultural property thefts).
54. See Olivier, supra note 52, at 640-41 (describing differing laws protecting cul-
tural property). Even though there are numerous regulations imposed by individual
countries to protect their respective cultural property, a country is not required to fol-
low another country's restrictions. Id. at 641. The result of this lack of uniformity is
that "the illegal export from one country generally does not bar lawful import into the
major art market nations." Id.
55. See Grover, supra note 48, at 1445 (examining differences between common
law and civil law countries' protection of cultural property). Common law countries
follow the general rule that original owners retain superior title to stolen property re-
gardless of whether a subsequent purchaser is innocent. Id. There are, however, ex-
ceptions to this rule. Id. Under English law a bonafide purchaser has "void" title. Id. at
1446. This void title means that if an original owner succeeds in a replevin action, he or
she does not have to reimburse a bona fide purchaser for the value of the property. Id.
However, according to English law, if a bona fide purchaser acquired the property dur-
ing "daylight hours in a public market or in a shop in the City of London" then he or
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nemo dat qui non habet,5 6 which means that sellers of property can
not transfer better title than they have themselves, and applies
regardless of whether a subsequent purchaser knows of any illicit
history of the property.57 On the other hand, civil law coun-
tries58 follow the opposite rule in which a thief of cultural prop-
erty can pass good title to a subsequent purchaser. 59 These di-
vergent legal principles create uncertain results as to which
owner has good title when protection of cultural property
reaches an international level.60
she acquires good tide. Id. This exception usually revolves around whether a pur-
chaser had the slightest knowledge of the property's illicit history. Id. If a purchaser
has any suspicion that an object has an illegal past the purchaser is required to investi-
gate the object to some extent. Id.; see LYNDEL V. PROTr & P.J. O'KEEFE, 3 LAW AND THE
CULTURAL HERITAGE, MOVEMENT, 402 (1989) (discussing treatment of bonafide purchas-
ers in United States ). A second exception to the general common law rule that a thief
can never pass on good tide is found in the United States. PROTT & O'KEEFE, supra, at
402. If a bona fide purchaser bought property from a seller who used deception, undue
influence, or misrepresentation to obtain the property from an original owner, the bona
fide purchaser has "voidable" title. Id. This voidable title becomes good title if an origi-
nal owner intended to transfer the property to a person, even if a person used gross
fraud to obtain the owner's consent. Id. Also, if an owner of the property "consents to
the transfer or somehow misleads a buyer into thinking that he will receive valid title," a
bonafide purchaser may receive good tide. Grover, supra note 48, at 1445. Additionally,
statutes of limitations or the doctrine of adverse possession sometimes allows a bona fide
purchaser to remain in possession of a stolen object. Id. at 1447.
56. See Collin, supra note 47, at 21 (explaining differences between common law
and civil law countries). This Latin principle prohibits anyone who can trace their
chain of title in property through a thief from obtaining good title. Id.; PROTr &
O'KEEFE, supra note 55, at 396 (discussing differences in treatment of bona fide purchas-
ers in common law and civil law jurisdictions). The Latin principle nemo dat qui non
habet means that sellers of property can never transfer better title than they have them-
selves. PROTr & O'KEEE, supra, at 397.
57. Grover, supra note 48, at 1445.
58. Id. at 1432. Civil law countries include most of Western Europe and many
Central and South American countries. Id.
59. Id. at 1448. In a civil law country, a thief can pass good title if a subsequent
purchaser is a bona fide purchaser who is acting in good faith with no notice of any
defects in a seller's title. Id. There are varying degrees of protection among civil law
countries. Id. Generally, Swiss, German, French, and Italian law allow bona fide pur-
chasers to obtain good title after a limitation period expires, even if they bought the
property from a thief. Id. at 1448-49. The limitation periods vary between these coun-
tries with Germany's being the longest, lasting ten years. Id. On the opposite end of
the spectrum, Italy grants a bona fide purchaser immediate tide. Id.
60. Collin, supra note 47, at 22. It is this difference in the law's treatment of a
subsequent purchaser that creates "safe havens by which thieves and traffickers may
pass good title to stolen property." Id. Usually, a thief will smuggle stolen cultural
property out of a country and then sell it in a Western European country that has
lenient bona fide purchaser laws. Id. at 19. This way the cultural property can be sold
1997] WHY RUSSIA SHOULD RETURN NAZI-LOOTED ART 1971
b. Use of the Bona Fide Purchaser Rule in Civil Law Countries
Propels Laundering of Cultural Property
The laundering of cultural property occurs when a thief
takes a stolen cultural object to a country that follows civil law
and then sells it to an unaware purchaser to create a valid trans-
fer of title." This general certainty that a purchaser will receive
good title to any cultural object purchased in a civil law country
increases the price for cultural objects and thus perpetuates the
cycle of illegal traffic in cultural property.6" Even an honest pur-
chaser in many instances will be unable to completely avoid the
possibility of contributing to this type of international trafficking
in cultural property.6"
Regardless of whether ajurisdiction applies common law or
civil law, there is still an unfair hardship placed on one of the
innocent parties. 64 The lack of uniformity in treatment of a bona
again and again at higher and higher profits and still retain proper bills of sale or
transfer which most major auction houses require to prove that good title exists. Id.
61. Grover, supra note 48, at 1441. This process is called art laundering. Id. The
basic conflict in treatment of a bonafide purchaser not only leads to this art laundering,
but also creates inflated prices for art in countries which favor the bona fide purchaser.
Id.
62. Id. If buyers know they will have good title to a cultural object, and therefore
not have to risk being forced to return a cultural object to its rightful owner, then
buyers will.pay more money for a cultural object. Id. This in turn creates an incentive
for thieves to sell stolen cultural objects in civil law countries because the thieves know
they will be able to get more money for stolen cultural objects. Id.; see Burke, supra
note 50, at 463 (explaining conflicting treatments of bona fide purchasers in different
countries). The creation of consistent laws favoring original owners would decrease the
amount of illegal cultural property because consistent laws favoring original owners
would create an incentive for buyers to investigate their cultural property purchases.
Burke, supra, at 463.
63. See Grover, supra note 48, at 1444 (discussing how differing national laws con-
tribute to illegal trade of cultural property). Some cultural objects may be laundered
several times which makes it more likely that a subsequent purchaser will have no
knowledge of the illicit history of a cultural object, and moreover, will not have to work
as hard to prove the lack of such knowledge. Id.; see also Kinderman, supra note 35, at
478 (explaining how differing national laws contribute to problems of illicit traffic in
cultural property). It is notjust the difference between civil law and common law juris-
dictions' treatment of bonafide purchasers which contributes to illicit traffic in cultural
property, but this difference in treatment perpetuates the illicit market in cultural prop-
erty. Kinderman, supra, at 478-79.
64. See Kinderman, supra note 35, at 491 (explaining how differing national laws
treatment of bona fide purchasers creates unfairness to one party). The difference be-
tween civil law and common law jurisdictions' treatment of bona fide purchasers is based
on differing policy considerations. Id. Common law countries that favor original own-
ers support the protection of property. Id. Whereas civil law countries that favor bona
fide purchasers support commercial transactions. Id. Kinderman explains that in order
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fide purchaser creates a situation where one party must always
unfairly relinquish possession of a cultural object.6" Whether a
relinquishing party is a bona fide purchaser or an original owner,
one innocent party will be forced to give up possession of a cul-
tural object which it believed was rightfully its own. 6  Given the
irreplaceable nature of cultural property, to relinquish posses-
sion is an especially unfair hardship.67
2. The Lex Locus Situs Rule
The second problem presented by international protection
of cultural property concerns the inherent inequities associated
with the application of the lex locus situs rule68 to disputes in own-
ership that arise from the illicit art market.69 The lex locus situs
rule requires that a court apply the law of the place where the
transfer of a movable object occurred whenever there is a con-
flict of laws.7' The effect of the lex locus situs rule is to put an
already vulnerable dispossessed cultural property owner at an
even greater disadvantage.7'
to create a comprehensive and workable set of international protections for cultural
property there must be a balance between these two valid policy interests. Id. Accord-
ing to Kinderman, a uniform approach would eliminate any unfair denial of recovery to
original owners as well as eliminate perpetual uncertainty of ownership to bona fide
purchasers. Id.
65. Collin, supra note 47, at 22.
66. Id.
67. See MERRYMAN & ELSEN, supra note 39, at xvi (explaining why cultural property
is so valuable).
68. See WILLIAMS, supra note 32, at 86 (describing lex locus situs rule as "the law of
the place where the movable object is situated at the time of the transfer").
69. See id. (discussing lex locus situs rule's application and acceptance); Grover,
supra note 48, at 1456-58 (explaining scholars' views that abandoning lex locus situs rule
would help original owners of cultural property). See generally Bator, supra note 2, at
289-94 (examining facts behind illicit trade in cultural property). There is little infor-
mation available concerning the illicit art market. Id. at 289. What is known about the
illicit art market comes directly from those involved. Id. at 290. There are many levels
of involvement to this problem. Id. at 292. Some illicit markets are well run and com-
plex in organization while others are amateur in scope and operation. Id.
70. See WILLIAMS, supra note 32, at 86 (examining arguments for and against use of
lex locus situs rule). The lex locus situs rule is used in both civil law and common law
jurisdictions. Id.
71. See Grover, supra note 48, at 1456 (addressing problems with application of lex
locus situs rule). The application of the lex locus situs rule would be unfair to original
owners. Id. Original owners never consented to having their cultural property stolen
or to having a foreign law apply to any resolution of the cultural property's ownership.
Id. But cf. WILLIAMS, supra note 32, at 87 (advocating use of lex locus situs rule because
of its inherent stability). The lex locus situs rule places some hardships on original own-
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Although the lex locus situs rule is widely accepted 72 and
used,73 it is not without critics.74 The main reason for criticism
of the lex locus situs rule revolves around a dispossessed owner's
lack of consent to the application of any foreign law to a possible
future dispute in ownership. 75  Scholars assert that innocent
owners should be allowed to have the law that they originally
chose apply.76
Scholars also argue that the confusion to commerce result-
ing from forgoing the lex locus situs rule makes its abandonment
unlikely. 77 If the lex locus situs rule were abandoned the result
would be uncertainty in a market accustomed to certainty.78 Ac-
cording to scholars, it would be even more inequitable for a
country to regain cultural property when there are no strong ties
to a cultural object or when a country used little diligence to
trace a cultural object's whereabouts.79
ers. Id. Any other resolution, however, would cause commercial problems because the
lex locus situs rule adds stability to an international market by making it clearly known
what rule of law applies. Id.
72. See WILLIAMS, supra note 32, at 86-87 (explaining why lex locus situs rule should
not be disregarded). The lex locus situs rule is the fairest and most practical answer
when questions arise regarding ownership between citizens of countries with differing
laws. Id. Accordingly, both civil and common law countries have adopted some form of
the lex locus situs rule to add stability to the marketplace. Id.
73. See Grover, supra note 48, at 1457-58 (discussing different countries' use of lex
locus situs rule). England is not likely to abandon its use of the lex locus situs rule. Id. at
1457. There are two main reasons for the widespread acceptance of the lex locus situs
rule in England. Id. First, the lex locus situs rule promotes reliable commercial transac-
tions because buyers only have to investigate the laws of the country where the property
is located. Id. Second, the lex locus situs rule maintains relations among countries by
allowing each country to determine how property is transferred within the country's
own borders. Id. The United States also uses the lex locus situs rule when there are
disputes involving the sale of property. Id. at 1458.
74. Id. at 1456. Several scholars suggest that a fairer way to treat original owners of
stolen property would be to abandon the lex locus situs rule. Id.
75. Id. In addition, dispossessed owners never consented to having their work sto-
len in the first place. Id.
76. See id. (explaining why application of lex locus situs rule can be unfair).
77. See WmLts, supra note 32, at 87 (discussing importance of lex locus situs rule).
78. See Grover, supra note 48, at 1456-57 (explaining various countries' use of lex
locus situs rule). Many scholars argue that because so many countries follow some ver-
sion of the lex locus situs rule, it has become a codified international law. Id. at 1457.
79. Id.; see Thomas W. Pecoraro, Choice of Law in Litigation to Recover National Cul-
tural Property: Efforts at Harmonization in Private International Law, 31 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 16-
17 (1990) (discussing reasons why lex locus situs rule should not be discarded). A better
solution to the difficulties with the lex locus situs rule is to combine it with a more lim-
ited recognition of a bona fide purchaser. Pecoraro, supra, at 17.
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C. International Protection of Cultural Property
The international community made two major attempts at
protecting cultural property.8 0 The first attempt culminated
soon after World War II ended, in the 1954 Hague Convention
for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
Conflict ("Hague Convention"). The second attempt occurred
more than fifteen years later in the 1970 UNESCO Convention
on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import,
Export, and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property
("UNESCO Convention").8
1. The Hague Convention
The Hague Convention marked a concerted international
step to protect cultural property. 83 It dealt exclusively with pro-
tection of cultural property during wartime.84 The Hague Con-
vention sought to prevent damage to cultural property85 of indi-
80. See Forbes, supra note 2, at 244 (discussing UNESCO Convention as comple-
menting Hague Convention of 1954).
81. The 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the
Event of Armed Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 215 (1956) [hereinafter Hague
Convention].
82. UNESCO Convention, supra note 36, 823 U.N.T.S. 231, 10 I.L.M. 289.
83. See WILLIaMS, supra note 32, at 34 (discussing background of Hague Conven-
tion). The cultural destruction during the first and second world wars demonstrated
the inadequacies of the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. Id. Consequently, the
international community united to create a higher level of protection for cultural prop-
erty. Id.
84. See Hague Convention, supra note 81, art. 18, 249 U.N.T.S. at 254 (stating that
for purposes of Hague Convention, war exists even when not officially recognized by
both countries embroiled in armed conflict). See David A. Meyer, Note, The 1954
Hague Cultural Property Convention and its Emergence into Customary International Law, 11
B.U. INT'L LJ. 349, 355 (1993) (explaining Hague Convention's improvement upon
previous international agreements protecting cultural property). The Hague Conven-
tion increased international protection of cultural property by expanding such protec-
tion to any kind of armed conflict. Id.; see also WILLIAMS, supra note 32, at 34 (discuss-
ing reasons for enactment of Hague Convention). Prior attempts at international pro-
tection of cultural property during wartime did not define what was meant by war.
WILLIAMS, supra, at 42. The absence of any definition of what constituted a war created
problems for the application of former international cultural property protections be-
cause countries were never sure what circumstances prompted the application of the
international protections. Id. The Hague Convention provides a description of "armed
conflict" to alleviate any possible confusion as to when it applies. Id. The occurrence of
hostile actions is enough to signal an "armed conflict" under the Hague Convention.
Id. No formal declaration of war or length of time of a conflict is necessary for the
Hague Convention to apply. Id.
85. See WILLIAMS, supra note 32, at 36 (discussing Hague Convention's division of
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vidual nations and of the world as a whole.86 It aimed to accom-
plish this goal by explicitly prohibiting countries from damaging
and stealing cultural property during a war.17
The Hague Convention built upon, but did not replace,
previous international agreements.8 Moreover, the Hague Con-
vention specifically provides for cooperation with the United Na-
cultural property into three main groups). Article 1 of the Hague Convention defines
cultural property as:
(a) movable or immovable property of great importance to the cultural heri-
tage of every people, such as monuments of architecture, art or history,
whether religious or secular; archaeological sites; groups of buildings which, as
a whole, are of historical or artistic interest; works of art; manuscripts, books
and other objects of artistic, historical or archaeological interest; as well as
scientific collections and important collections of books or archives or of re-
productions of the property defined above;
(b) buildings whose main and effective purpose is to preserve or exhibit the
movable cultural property defined in sub-paragraph (a) such as museums,
large libraries and depositories of archives, and refuges intended to shelter, in
the event of armed conflict, the movable cultural property defined in sub-
paragraph (a);
(c) centres containing a large amount of cultural property as defined in sub-
paragraphs (a) and (b), to be known as "centres containing monuments".
Hague Convention, supra note 81, art. 1, 249 U.N.T.S. at 242.
86. See Hague Convention, supra note 81, pmbl., 249 U.N.T.S. at 240 (setting forth
reasoning for Hague Convention's enactment). "Being convinced that damage to the
cultural property belonging to any people whatsoever means damage to the cultural
heritage of all mankind, since each people makes its contribution to the culture of the
world". Hague Convention, supra, 249 U.NT.S. at 240. See also WILLIAMS, supra note
32, at 36 (explaining aims of Hague Convention).
87. See Hague Convention, supra note 81, art. 4, 249 U.N.T.S. at 242-44 (explaining
Hague Convention's general prohibition against destruction of cultural property); see
also WILLIAMS, supra note 32, at 36-37 (detailing Hague Convention's attempts to pre-
vent pillaging cultural property). The Hague Convention prohibits any act of hostility
against cultural property. Id. Included in this general prohibition are any acts of theft,
pillaging, or vandalism of cultural property. Id. The Hague Convention states that:
The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect cultural property situated
within their own territory as well as within the territory of other High Con-
tracting Parties by refraining from any use of the property and its immediate
surroundings or of the appliances in use for its protection for purposes which
are likely to expose it to destruction or damage in the event of armed conflict;
and by refraining from any act of hostility directed against such property.
Hague Convention, supra, 249 U.N.T.S. at 242-44.
88. See Hague Convention, supra note 81, art. 36, 249 U.N.T.S. at 264-66 (explain-
ing Hague Convention's relation to previous international conventions is not meant to
replace previous conventions but merely expand them). See also WiLLiAMs, supra note
32, at 34 (explaining reasons for enactment of Hague Convention). After the interna-
tional community realized that mechanized warfare put cultural objects at an extreme
risk that previous agreements simply could not protect, the international community
organized and implemented the Hague Convention. Id.
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tions if necessary.89 It also requires an international register of
any cultural objects that need special protection,90 distinctive
markings to protect cultural objects,91 and, if necessary, techni-
cal assistance from the United Nations Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization ("UNESCO") .92
Although the Hague Convention was a useful step to protect
cultural property, scholars agree that the Hague Convention has
not been effective in application.93 The Hague Convention's
main weaknesses result from its vague language, 94 the low per-
centage of ratifications,9" and the reluctance of countries to
completely enforce its provisions.96 Nevertheless, the Hague
Convention remains the primary means of international protec-
tion of cultural property during war.9 7
89. Hague Convention, supra note 81, res. 1, 249 U.N.T.S. at 236.
90. See WILLIAMS, supra note 32, at 35. (explaining Hague Convention's registra-
tion system established to protect especially fragile cultural property); see also Hague
Convention, supra note 81, art. 8, 249 U.N.T.S. at 246-48 (stating guidelines for deter-
mination which cultural property deserves special protection and how to undertake
such special protection).
91. See Hague Convention, supra note 81, arts. 6, 16, 17, 249 U.N.T.S. at 244, 252,
254 (explaining what distinctive emblem must look like and when emblem can be
used); see also Meyer, supra note 84, at 355 (describing emblem as blue and white shield
as insignia or as flag to indicate presence of cultural property).
92. See Hague Convention, supra note 81, art. 23, 249 U.N.T.S. at 258 (stating that
"[t]he High Contracting Parties may call upon the United Nations Educational, Scien-
tific and Cultural Organization for technical assistance in organizing the protection of
their cultural property, or in connexion with any other problem arising out of the appli-
cation of the present Convention or the Regulations for its execution.").
93. JOTE, supra note 45, at 314. One legal scholar argues that the Hague Conven-
tion needs to be amended in order to become more effective. Id. One solution would
be an amendment of the vague provisions to clear up their uncertainty. Id. Another
possible solution would be the creation of a new international entity to oversee the
Hague Convention's effective implementation. Id.
94. Id. There are some parts of the text of the Hague Convention that resulted in
problems with its application. Id. Article 6 does not give any specific guidance as to
where or how cultural property should be marked. Id. Also, the sanctions meant to be
a deterrent that are espoused in Article 28 have no real effect due to loose wording. Id.;
see Meyer, supra note 84, at 357 (explaining problems with sanctions of Hague Conven-
tion). The sanctions mentioned in the Hague Convention are ineffective because the
actual creation and application of any sanctions are left to the parties to impose de-
pending upon the situation. Meyer, supra, at 357. This lack of specificity leaves much
room for individual discretion or the lack thereof. Id.
95. SeeJOTE, supra note 45, at 314 (noting that as of 1992 only 76 of 163 UNESCO
members ratified Hague Convention).
96. Id.
97. See Borodkin, supra note 21, at 388 (mentioning Hague Convention's use in
Iraqi-Persian Gulf Conflict of 1991); see also Meyer, supra note 84, at 356 (stating Hague
Convention's status as customary international law).
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2. The UNESCO Convention
In 1970, the UNESCO Convention9 8 supplemented the
Hague Convention of 1954 and became the primary means of
regulating the illegal art market.99 The UNESCO Convention
increased international protection of cultural property by ex-
tending such protection beyond times of war.' By relying on
both administrative law' and public international law,10 2 the
UNESCO Convention sought to create a true set of international
rules to protect cultural property. 0 3
The UNESCO Convention requires any country exporting
cultural property to provide adequate ownership documentation
with an exported object.10 4 It further provides that all signatory
98. UNESCO Convention, supra note 36, 823 U.N.T.S. 231, 10 I.L.M. 289.
99. See Olivier, supra note 52, at 642 (explaining that first major international at-
tempt to destroy illegal art market was UNESCO Convention); see also Kinderman, supra
note 35, at 469 (stating that UNESCO Convention is most important international
treaty protecting cultural property).
100. See Borodkin, supra note 21, at 388 (explaining strengths and weaknesses of
current protections of cultural property).
101. See Lyndel V. Prott, UNESCO and UNIDROIT A Partnership Against Trafficking
in Cultural Objects, 1 UNIFoRM L. REV. 59, 69 (1996) (discussing basis for enactment of
UNIDROIT Convention). The UNESCO Convention imposes several administrative
obligations on its signatories. Id. Article 6, for example, requires a country to initiate
an export control system. UNESCO Convention, supra note 36, art. 6, 823 U.N.T.S. at
240, 10 I.L.M. at 290-91. Article 7(b) (i) is also administrative in nature since it prohib-
its the importation of objects stolen from a museum, and religious or secular monu-
ments, if the object in question is documented inventory. UNESCO Convention, supra,
art. 7(b)(i), 823 U.N.T.S. at 240, 10 I.L.M. at 291.
102. See Prott, supra note 101, at 70 (describing relationship between UNESCO
Convention and UNIDROIT Convention as partnership).
103. Marina Schneider, The UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cul-
tural Objects, Explanatory Paper (visited June 24, 1997) <http://www.city.ac.uk/artspol/
schneider.html> (also on file with the Fordham International Law Journal); see ETIENNE
CLJMENT, THE UNESCO CONVENTION ON THE MEANS OF PROHIBITING AND PREVENTING
THE ILLICIT IMPORT, EXPORT AND TRANSFER OF OWNERSHIP OF CULTURAL PROPERTY
(1970), reprinted in ILLIcrr TRAFFic IN CULTURAL PROPERTY - MUSEUMS AGAINST PILLAGE,
45, 51 (Harrie Leyten ed., 1995) (discussing improvements in international protection
of cultural property resulting from UNESCO Convention). An important effect of the
UNESCO Convention is the change in the international community's attitude toward
protection of cultural property created by the UNESCO Convention's enactment. CLJ-
MENT, supra, at 51. The UNESCO Convention is the international community's attempt
to create a moral obligation for countries to protect cultural property, whether or not
they are signatories to the UNESCO Convention. Id.
104. UNESCO Convention, supra note 36, art. 6, 823 U.N.T.S. at 240, 10 I.L.M. at
290-91. Article 6 requires the introduction of an export certificate for any object, that
the object not be exported unless it has such a certificate, and that the restriction be
publicized. Id.
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nations should enact legislation prohibiting collecting institu-
tions10 5 from possessing any illegally obtained cultural prop-
erty.1 16 The UNESCO Convention limits this prohibition on the
possession of illegal cultural property, however, by any require-
ments imposed by national legislation.107 Furthermore, the
UNESCO Convention places the burden on the importing coun-
try to facilitate the return of any stolen property to the request-
ing country.)°
The UNESCO Convention does contain some drawbacks.10 9
Some scholars note that not enough art importing countries are
signatories to the UNESCO Convention for it to be effective.110
Although over eighty nations ratified the UNESCO Convention,
the lack of widespread support by art importing nations renders
the agreement ineffective. 1 The lack of widespread accept-
105. See UNESCO Convention, supra note 36, art. 7(a), 823 U.N.T.S. at 240, 10
I.L.M. at 291 (stating that signatory nations take necessary steps consistent with their
national legislation). Collecting institutions are museums and similar institutions that
have acquisition policies. PRoI-r & O'KEEFE, supra note 55, at 745. The obtainment of
cultural property, or acquisition policy, is generally viewed as a museum's main pur-
pose. KARL E. MEYER, THE PLUNDERED PAST 49-54 (1973). Problems arise, however,
when acquisition policies and conservation policies conflict Id. at 50. This conflict
between policies often arises when money obtained through the sale of cultural objects,
or de-accessioning, is used for the acquisition of new cultural objects. Id.
106. UNESCO Convention, supra note 36, art. 7(a), 823 U.N.T.S. at 240, 10 I.L.M.
at 291.
107. Id. art. 7(a), 823 U.N.T.S. at 240, 10 I.L.M. at 291. Article 7 of the UNESCO
Convention states:
The States Parties to this Convention undertake:
(a) To take the necessary measures, consistent with national legislation, to pre-
vent museums and similar institutions within their territories from acquiring
cultural property originating in another State Party which has been illegally
exported after entry into force of this Convention, in the States concerned.
Whenever possible, to inform a State of origin Party to this Convention of an
offer of such cultural property illegally removed from that State after the entry
into force of this Convention in both States;
Id.
108. Id. art. 7(b)(ii), 823 U.N.T.S. at 240, 10 I.L.M. at 291.
109. See Prott, supra note 101, at 69-70 (discussing shortfalls of UNESCO Conven-
tion and how UNIDROIT Convention complements UNESCO Convention rather than
being replacement).
110. See Nina R. Lenzner, Comment, The Illicit International Trade in Cultural Prop-
erty: Does the UNIDROIT Convention Provide an Effective Remedy for the Shortcomings of the
UNESCO Convention?, 15 U. PA.J. INrr'L Bus. L. 469, 478 (1994) (explaining that main
weakness of UNESCO Convention is that few art importing nations have signed and
implemented UNESCO Convention).
111. Id. at 479. The United States is one of the few major art importing nations to
ratify the UNESCO Convention. Id. at 478. The United States ratification followed
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ance 1 12 of the UNESCO Convention occurred in part because
the UNESCO Convention does not provide recourse for a pri-
vate institution or individual. 1 ' Another criticism of the
UNESCO Convention is that it places more importance on na-
tional accumulation of art rather than international protection
of art." 4 Furthermore, the UNESCO Convention fails to unify
the varying national laws with respect to who has the burden of
proving the existence of title in a cultural object."15
D. The UNIDROIT Convention
The International Institute for the Unification of Private
Law's 1995 convention' 1 6 ("UNIDROIT Convention") concen-
trated on two specific situations that the UNESCO Convention
left unresolved." 7 The first situation involves the conflict of
ownership between an original owner of stolen art and a subse-
more than ten years of Congressional debate. Id. at 486. However, the United States
only ratified Articles 7 and 9 of the UNESCO Convention. Id. at 487. Legal scholars
argue that this delay in enactment combined with the narrow implementation by the
United States weakens the UNESCO Convention's possibility of having a positive impact
on the illicit art market. Id. at 485-87; see Barbara Hoffman, How UNIDROIT Protects
Cultural Property: Part I, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 3, 1995, at 5, 7 (examining UNIDROIT Conven-
tion's protections of cultural property). Only six art importing nations have become
signatories to the UNESCO Convention: Argentina, Australia, Canada, Italy, the United
States, and Switzerland. Hoffman, supra, at 7. Most art importing countries feel that
the UNESCO Convention's inadequate protection of the bona fide purchaser makes it
ineffective and, therefore, have not ratified the agreement. Id.
112. See Olivier, supra note 52, at 642-47 (discussing difficulty with UNESCO Con-
vention); Kinderman, supra note 35, at 470 (explaining that despite UNESCO Conven-
tion's acclaimed purpose it has not proven successful in practice).
113. UNESCO Convention, supra note 36, art. 7(b)(i), 823 U.N.T.S. at 240, 10
I.L.M. at 291; see Prott, supra note 101, at 62 (discussing scope of UNESCO Conven-
tion). The UNESCO Convention does not help private owners because it is founded on
the principle of government action. Prott, supra, at 62. Accordingly, unless the govern-
ment of a requesting party designates a privately owned object as belonging to the state,
the UNESCO Convention would not apply. Id. Many countries do not advocate gov-
ernmental involvement in cultural affairs, therefore, there was no reason for those
countries to ratify the UNESCO Convention. Id.
114. See Olivier, supra note 52, at 646 (examining shortfalls of UNESCO Conven-
tion).
115. See Hoffman, supra note 111, at 7 (explaining how UNIDROIT Convention
complements UNESCO Convention). The UNESCO Convention failed to create a uni-
form law which specified the substantive and procedural rules for determining which
party had the burden of proof when an object's title was in dispute and the parties
involved were from countries with contradictory rules of law. Id.
116. UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 24, 34 I.L.M. at 1322.
117. Explanatory Report, supra note 26, at 21. The UNIDROIT Convention specif-
ically addresses the confusion that resulted from Article 7(b) (ii) of the UNESCO Con-
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quent good faith purchaser. 118 The second situation concerns
the illegal removal of cultural property across national bor-
ders.1 19
1. Background on the UNIDROIT Convention
The UNIDROIT Convention is the most recent step forward
in the protection of cultural property. 20 UNESCO requested
the formation of the UNIDROIT Convention in the early
1980s.121 The reasons for this request included the failure of the
UNESCO Convention to solve the private law questions involved
in the protection of cultural property,1 22 the vague language in
the UNESCO Convention, 12 3 and the unclear scope of the
vention. Id. The UNIDROIT Convention's birth from the UNESCO Convention lim-
ited the objectives of the UNIDROIT Convention. Id.
118. Id. The UNIDROIT Convention sought merely to introduce some sort of
minimum standards for countries to deal with the conflict between civil law and com-
mon law systems that allowed laundering of cultural property. Id. By introducing a
baseline rule, the drafters of the UNIDROIT Convention thought that the UNIDROIT
Convention could gain greater acceptance. Id.
119. See Short, supra note 49, at 650 (discussing national attempts at regulating
international trade in cultural property). Most countries have some degree of export
laws. Id. Problems arise, however, when importing countries are unaware of any such
laws and there is no international regulation to enforce any such national legislation
outside of the country's borders. See Explanatory Report, supra note 26, at 21 (discuss-
ing problems that UNESCO Convention left unresolved). ,
120. See Forbes, supra note 2, at 246 (discussing development of international pro-
tection of cultural property).
121. Explanatory Report, supra note 26, at 18. In 1974, UNIDROIT drafted a Uni-
form Law on the Acquisition in Good Faith of Corporeal Movables. Id. This draft pro-
vided the genesis for UNESCO's asking UNIDROIT to study the rules regarding the
prohibition of illegal traffic in cultural property. Id. The intent behind the project
being that any product of UNIDROIT became a supplement to the UNESCO Conven-
tion. Id.
122. See id. (explaining why UNESCO approached UNIDROIT to solve problems
of international protection of cultural property). One of the problems with interna-
tional protection of cultural property is that different national laws treat bona fide pur-
chasers unequally. Id. The UNESCO Convention left open a loophole between civil
law and common law countries which allowed art thieves to create a valid title to a
stolen cultural object. See Prott, supra note 101, at 60-61 (discussing development of
UNIDROIT Convention). Reports on the efficacy of the UNESCO Convention indi-
cated that aspects of private law might noticeably impact the illegal art market. Id. at
60.
123. See Explanatory Report, supra note 26, at 18 (explaining drawbacks to
UNESCO Convention). Article 3 of the UNESCO Convention called- for the general
respect of export control laws of other countries. Id. Articles 7 and 9, however, only
provided regulations with respect to inventoried objects stolen from collecting institu-
tions or archaeological sites. Id. The requirement that an object be documented as
inventory of a public institution further reduces the already limited scope of the
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UNESCO Convention.1
2 4
The UNIDROIT Convention is based on the common law
philosophy advocating that cultural property must be returned
to its true owner.125 In order to appease civil law countries, the
UNIDROIT Convention provides that any dispossessed owner of
cultural property who was a bona fide purchaser shall receive
compensation for the return of the cultural property to its origi-
nal owner.12 6 According to the UNIDROIT Convention, in or-
der to receive compensation, possessors of stolen cultural objects
must have exercised due diligence to be certain that a cultural
objects were not stolen when they first obtained possession.12 7
This due diligence requirement creates an incentive for dealers
UNESCO Convention. See Kinderman, supra note 35, at 473-75 (discussing treatment
of stolen cultural objects under Article 7 of UNESCO Convention).
124. Explanatory Report, supra note 26, at 18. Some countries interpreted Article
3 of the UNESCO Convention to mean that every signatory country must return all
cultural objects found to be stolen or illegally exported. See Prott, supra note 101, at 62
(comparing scope of UNESCO Convention to that of UNIDROIT Convention). Coun-
tries with a great deal of trade in cultural objects, such as the United States, were unwill-
ing to sign a convention with such a seemingly extensive scope. Id. The United States
managed to avoid Article 3 altogether by interpreting Articles 7 and 9 of the UNESCO
Convention to create restrictive prohibitions on imports if a requesting country proves
that there is a specific danger. Id. at 62-63. These regulations implemented by the
United States according to its interpretation of the UNESCO Convention are generally
limited by a time period as well as the specific type of object restricted from a certain
country or region. Id. at 63.
125. UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 24, art. 3, 34 I.L.M. at 1331.
126. Id. art. 4, 34 I.L.M. at 1332; see Barbara Hoffman, How UNIDROIT Protects
Cultural Property: Part II, N.Y.LJ., Mar. 10, 1995, at 5, 11 (discussing UNIDROIT Con-
vention's protection of cultural property). Article 4 of the UNIDROIT Convention re-
quires compensation for possessors who must return a cultural object if the possessors
prove that they took adequate precautions before purchasing the object. See Explana-
tory Report, supra note 26, at 30 (explaining how UNIDROIT Convention helps protect
cultural property). The UNIDROIT Convention sought to balance the opposing par-
ties by including this provision. Id. The reasoning behind the inclusion of Article 4 was
that the weakened position of good faith purchasers, a significant political and philo-
sophical change in many countries, would be more acceptable by providing for com-
pensation of good faith purchasers. Id.
127. UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 24, art. 4.4, 34 I.L.M. at 1332. Article 4.4
states that:
In determining whether the possessor exercised due diligence, regard shall be
had to all the circumstances of the acquisition, including the character of the
parties, the price paid, whether the possessor consulted any reasonably accessi-
ble register of stolen cultural objects, and any other relevant information and
documentation which it could reasonably have obtained, and whether the pos-
sessor consulted accessible agencies or took any other step that a reasonable
person would have taken in the circumstances.
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to provide ownership documentation for any cultural objects
they sell. 12 8
Although the international community agrees that cultural
property needs more international protection, the initial recep-
tion to the UNIDROIT Convention has been mixed.12 9 One
area of controversy surrounding the UNIDROIT Convention is
that its definition of what constitutes a stolen object differs from
that of the UNESCO Convention.'" Some critics feel this new
definition is too broad and would create an unnecessary sense of
anxiety throughout the art market.' 3 l Another source of contro-
versy regarding the UNIDROIT Convention is the requirement
that any requesting country may retrieve its stolen cultural ob-
jects.1 3 2 Although the UNIDROIT Convention strives to protect
the integrity of a country's cultural heritage,13 3 the fear among
128. See Hoffman, supra note 126, at 11 (noting potential problems with
UNIDROIT Convention's due diligence requirement). The due diligence requirement
could backfire and create a stronger black market by leading to an increased number of
forged documents to fulfill the due diligence standard and avoid controversy over who
possesses actual title. Id. In addition, those involved in the art trade argue that this due
diligence requirement, by making it more cumbersome to remove objects, creates an
unfair burden that could lead to the destruction of cultural objects from warring na-
tions. Id.
129. See Georgina Adam, Art Sales: They're Out to Steal Our Stolen Art, Georgina Adam
Has No Love for the Latest Scheme From UNESCO, DAILY TEL. LONDON, May 22, 1995, at 16
(explaining general fear that UNIDROIT Convention will result in removal of art hang-
ing on private citizens' walls if they cannot prove they are rightful owners); cf. Hoffman,
supra note 126, at 11 (explaining that involvement of United States in UNIDROIT is
imperative to reaffirm United States' commitment to protection of cultural property).
See generally Alexandra Peers, Art World Shaken by Nations Seeking to Reclaim Items, WALL
ST. J., June 21, 1994, at C1 (providing diverse views on UNIDROIT Convention, includ-
ing art dealers' fears that it would result in end of their livelihood).
130. UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 24, art. 3.2, 34 I.L.M. at 1331. Article 3.2
defines a stolen object as "a cultural object which has been unlawfully excavated or
lawfully excavated but unlawfully retained shall be considered stolen, when consistent
with the law of the State where the excavation took place." Id. This differs from the
UNESCO Convention which did not apply to the problems caused by the looting of
undocumented excavations. See Hoffman, supra note 111, at 7-8 (discussing implica-
tions of UNIDROIT Convention for international protection of cultural property).
131. See Hoffman, supra note 126, at 11 (explaining people's fears about
UNIDROIT Convention).
132. UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 24, art. 5, 34 I.L.M. at 1332. Article 5.1.
states that "[a] Contracting State may request the court or other competent authority of
another Contracting State to order the return of a cultural object illegally exported
from the territory of the requesting State." Id.
133. Id. app., 34 I.L.M. at 1330. The Appendix of the UNIDROIT Convention
explains that the parties involved acknowledged purpose includes protecting the cul-
tural heritage of countries for the good of humanity. Id.
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its critics is that requesting countries might abuse the
UNIDROIT Convention's provision requiring the return of sto-
len cultural property. 34
2. Scope of the UNIDROIT Convention
Article 1 of the UNIDROIT Convention establishes its scope
of application.1 35  The United States requested that the
UNIDROIT Convention address the problem of protecting cul-
tural property during wars,1 36 but eventually dropped this as an
option. 13 7  In addition, there was much discussion during the
Convention about possible retroactive implications. 138 Last min-
134. See Olivier, supra note 52, at 661 (explaining critics fear that UNIDROIT Con-
vention's vague criteria for what constitutes significant cultural objects means that U.S.
courts will have to enforce every countries' export and cultural property laws);
UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 24, art. 5, 34 I.L.M. at 1332 (describing possible
interests requesting countries may use to have stolen cultural objects returned). Article
5.3 states:
The court or other competent authority of the State addressed shall order the
return of an illegally exported cultural object if the requesting State estab-
lishes that the removal of the object from its territory significantly impairs one
or more of the following interests: (a) the physical preservation of the object
or of its context; (b) the integrity of a complex object; (c) the preservation of
information of, for example, a scientific or historical character; (d) the tradi-
tional or ritual use of the object by a tribal or indigenous community, or estab-
lishes that the object is of significant cultural importance for the requesting
State.
UNIDROIT Convention, supra, art. 5, 34 I.L.M. at 1333.
135. See Schneider, supra note 103, at 3 (discussing implications of Article 1 of
UNIDROIT Convention). A main point of importance regarding Article 1 is that it only
applies to claims that are international in character. Id. Secondly,Article 1 establishes
application of the UNIDROIT Convention to claims made by any Contracting State no
matter where an original theft of a cultural object occurred. Id. Also, the UNIDROIT
Convention's rules only apply to thefts of cultural property that contravene rules en-
acted to protect a Contracting State's cultural heritage. Id.
136. UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 24, 34 I.L.M. at 1324. The UNIDROIT
Convention did not resolve any issues that may arise from objects taken during wartime.
Id.
137. Id.
138. See Explanatory Report, supra note 26, at 42 (discussing drafters' reasoning
behind adoption of final convention articles). Originally, the UNIDROIT Convention.
contained a provision in Article 10 applying to a theft occurring before the institution
of the Convention. Id. The draft UNIDROIT Convention at that point also included a
specific article making the UNIDROIT Convention proactive in effect. Id. When the
UNIDROIT Convention deleted the proactive clause as a result of negotiations between
representatives, it became unclear whether the Convention remained proactive. Id.
The end result is the same as if the UNIDROIT Convention still contained the proactive
clause. Id. One of the most debated aspects of the UNIDROIT Convention was the
possibility of a retroactive effect. See Schneider, supra note 103, at 13-14 (discussing
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ute negotiations settled this controversy and created a purely
proactive agreement that strongly condemned prior acts.13 9
3. The Principle of Return (Article 3)
Article 3 of the UNIDROIT Convention explicitly states that
anyone possessing stolen cultural property must return that
property to its rightful owner. 40 The drafters of the UNIDROIT
Convention intentionally made Article 3 clear because, in reality,
it is an important change for some countries. 41  This section
specifies time limitations for the return of a cultural object de-
pending upon the nature of the stolen object as well as the na-
ture of the theft.
14 2
The time limitations of the UNIDROIT Convention revolve
around the idea that a statute of limitations should not begin
until an original owner knows, or should have known, the loca-
tion of a stolen object.'43 If the identity of a possessor of a stolen
cultural object is unknown, the drafters of the UNIDROIT Con-
vention allowed a general grace period of three years for an orig-
inal owner to request a cultural object's return once the posses-
general provisions of UNIDROIT Convention). A last minute compromise arranged
between opposing factions allowed the UNIDROIT Convention to remain proactive.
Id. Supporters of retroactivity compromised by including the language of both the Pre:
amble and Article 10. Id. The Preamble of the UNIDROIT Convention explicitly states
that "the adoption of the provisions of this Convention for the future in no way confers
any approval or legitimacy upon illegal transactions whatever kind which may have
taken place before the entry into force of the Convention." See UNIDROIT Conven-
tion, supra note 24, pmbl., 34 I.L.M. at 1330 (setting forth objectives of UNIDROIT
Convention).
139. See Schneider, supra note 103, at 14 (discussing retroactive implications as
one of most controversial aspects of UNIDROIT Convention).
140. UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 24, art. 3.1, 34 I.L.M. at 1331 (explaining
what is meant by restitution of cultural objects for UNIDROIT Convention). Article 3.1
reads: "[t]he possessor of a cultural object which has been stolen shall return it." Id.
141. See Schneider, supra note 103, at 4-5 (explaining philosophical basis for Arti-
cle 3 of UNIDROIT Convention); see also Kinderman, supra note 35, at 505-08 (discuss-
ing UNIDROIT Convention's approach to stolen cultural property in Article 3).142. UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 24, arts. 3.3-3.5, 34 I.L.M. at 1331. The
UNIDROIT Convention's time limitations vary depending upon the nature of the sto-
len object, the possessor of the object, and the rightful owner of the object. Id. Gener-
ally, a claimant is allowed three years from the knowledge of the identity of the posses-
sor to request an object's return. Id. An overall time limitation of fifty to seventy-five
years may also apply to a request for the return of an object. Id.
143. See Kinderman, supra note 35, at 506 (explaining reasoning behind time limi-
tations of UNIDROIT Convention).
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sor's identity becomes known."' The UNIDROIT Convention
further includes an overall time limitation of fifty years for a bona
fide purchaser to possess a stolen cultural object before a bona
fide possessor can lawfully own a stolen cultural object.'45 Article
3 of the UNIDROIT Convention also provides that no overall
time limitation, besides the three year limitation for claims be-
ginning when an original owner has actual knowledge of the
identity of the stolen cultural object's possessor, should apply for
a claim based on the length of possession if a stolen cultural ob-
ject is important to a country's monument, archaeological site,
or public collection. 4 The final clause in Article 3 of the
UNIDROIT Convention allows a country to place a cap of sev-
enty-five years on claims for return of cultural property, to avoid
the possibility of having such lawsuits left open indefinitely.147
This cap on when claims may be raised adds greater flexibility to
the contracting states' situation. 48
4. The Principle of Compensation (Article 4)
Article 4 of the UNIDROIT Convention provides guidance
for determining whether a possessor of a stolen cultural object
should receive compensation."4 9 This idea of compensation is
the counterpart to Article 3 of the UNIDROIT Convention. 5
The drafters of the UNIDROIT Convention realized that Article
144. UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 24, arts. 3.3-3.4, 34 I.L.M. at 1331.
145. Id. art. 3.3, 34 I.L.M. at 1331.
146. Id. art. 3.4, 34 I.L.M. at 1331.
147. Id. art. 3.5, 34 I.L.M. at 1331.
148. See Prott, supra note 101, at 66 (examining reasons why UNIDROIT Conven-
tion included time limitations). Neither the Hague Convention nor the UNESCO Con-
vention established time limits under which claims must be made. Id. The time limita-
tions for claims contained in the UNIDROIT Convention resulted from last minute
compromises made by the contracting parties. Id.
149. See UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 24, art. 4.1, 34 I.L.M. at 1332 (explain-
ing requirements for compensation). Article 4.1 states:
The possessor of a stolen cultural object required to return it shall be entitled,
at the time of its restitution, to payment of fair and reasonable compensation
provided that the possessor neither knew nor ought reasonably to have known
that the object was stolen and can prove that it exercised due diligence when
acquiring the object.
Id.
150. See Kinderman, supra note 35, at 507 (discussing bona fide purchaser's receipt
of compensation).
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3 weakened the position of bona fide purchasers.1"' The inclu-
sion of Article 4 made the UNIDROIT Convention more accept-
able for countries with civil law jurisdictions. 1 2
Article 4 of the UNIDROIT Convention also determines
what constitutes just compensation. 53 The UNIDROIT Conven-
tion calls for the exercise of due diligence by possessors if they
want to receive compensation when parting with stolen cultural
property. 154 Article 4.4 of the UNIDROIT Convention specifies
the circumstances a court may look to when considering
whether a possessor of a stolen cultural object exercised due dili-
gence when purchasing the cultural object, and if so, whether a
possessor should be compensated. 1
55
II. CURRENT CONFLICT WITH THE DISRUPTION OF
CULTURAL PROPERTY FROM WORLD WAR II
During World War II the Nazis pillaged cultural property to
an extent never before witnessed. 156 The pillaging, however, did
151. See Explanatory Report, supra note 26, at 30 (explaining Article 4 of
UNIDROIT Convention).
152. Id. The drafters of the UNIDROIT Convention realized that favoring original
owners of cultural property would be a drastic change for civil law countries. Id. The
payment of compensation to bona fide purchasers became a compromise position .for
the opposing sides. Id. The inclusion of the compensation provision, however, does
not necessarily mean that countries with laws providing for return of stolen cultural
property without compensation must alter their existing laws. Id.
153. See UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 24, art. 4.1, 34 I.L.M. at 1332 (refer-
ring to compensation as "fair and reasonable"). In order for purchasers to be compen-
sated when they are forced to return cultural property to its original owners, purchasers
must show that they had no knowledge, or suspicion, of the cultural property's illegal
past. Explanatory Report, supra note 26, at 30 (discussing what requirements for com-
pensation are for UNIDROIT Convention). This requirement is referred to as an exer-
cise of due diligence and is meant to be judged by a court. Id. at 31-32.
154. See Explanatory Report, supra note 26, at 30 (discussing UNIDROIT Conven-
tion's use of due diligence requirement instead of good faith requirement).
155. UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 24, art. 4.4. 34 I.L.M. at 1332. Article 4.4
states that:
In determining whether the possessor exercised due diligence, regard shall be
had to all the circumstances of the acquisition, including the character of the
parties, the price paid, whether the possessor consulted any reasonably accessi-
ble register of stolen cultural objects, and any other relevant information and
documentation which it could reasonably have obtained, and whether the pos-
sessor consulted accessible agencies or took any other step that a reasonable
person would have taken in the circumstances.
Id.
156. Lewis, supra note 28, at Dl.
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not end when the Nazis surrendered. 157 The Russian Govern-
ment is also guilty of pillaging thousands of cultural objects at
the end of World War I.158 These recently discovered acts of
pillaging created chaos in the international community.'5 9
A. Russian Possession of Looted Cultural Property
Hitler began the confiscation of cultural property shortly af-
ter he attained political power in Germany. 6 ' The Russian Gov-
ernment continued confiscating cultural objects even after the
Allies defeated Hitler.16' Only a few years ago, however, the Rus-
sian Government admitted to possessing secret caches of cultural
objects. 162
1. The Looting of Cultural Property During World War II
When Hitler rose to power in Germany, he implemented a
campaign of cultural confiscation.163  Hitler began by sup-
pressing art he deemed degenerate. 64 As Hitler slowly cleared
157. See Gambrell, supra note 29, at 88-89 (describing Soviet plans to create their
own super museum out of Nazi-looted cultural property).
158. See Amei Wallach, What a Steal, NEWSDAY, Mar. 28, 1995, at B4 (detailing Rus-
sian Government's confiscation of cultural property directly after World War II).
159. See Michael R. Gordon, Hot Issue For Russia: Should It Return Nazi Plunder?, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 17, 1997, at A3 (discussing Russia's current struggles whether or not to
return World War II plunder).
160. See NICHOtAS, supra note 14, at 9 (discussing enactment of Reich Chamber of
Culture following Hitler's election to Chancellor of Germany).
161. See AKINSHA & KoZLOV, supra note 29, at 43-45 (describing Soviet enactment
of Trophy Brigades).
162. See Robert Hughes, The Spoils of War (Art Treasures), TIME, Apr. 3, 1995, at 64,
65-66 (explaining Hermitage Museum Director's announcement in October of 1995
that several thousand looted objects from World War II remained in Russian posses-
sion).
163. See NIcHOLAs, supra note 14, at 16-17 (explaining how Reich Chamber of Cul-
ture confiscated and destroyed cultural property). Hitler's plan for world domination
rested upon the idea of complete devastation of conquered nations. Id. at 61. Hitler
commanded his military leaders to be merciless during invasions. Id. Cultural property
fared no worse than its owners under Hitler's reign. Id. Although some destruction of
cultural property is inevitable during any armed invasion, Hitler's invasion of Poland in
1939 was unusual because of the extraordinary amount of cultural devastation based on
inside knowledge of locations of cultural objects. Id. Hitler's plan required the 'Ger-
manization' of vanquished territories such as Poland. Id. at 63. Nothing but complete
devastation of all aspects of a nation's cultural heritage would suffice to accomplish
Hitler's goal. Id.
164. Id. at 11-24. Franz Marc, Paul Klee, and Emil Nolde are a few examples of the
type of artists Hider proclaimed degenerate artists. Id. Hitler forced most degenerate
artists out of Germany. Id. Those degenerate artists that remained were prohibited
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out any art he found offensive, he started collecting works that
satisfied his artistic tastes.1 65 Hitler's seizure of art escalated as
his power increased.1 66 Hitler efficiently planned and executed
his campaign to create a "universal" Aryan society.1 6 7 Once the
Nazis' campaign to create a "universal" Aryan society was well
underway, 168 every work of art was within the Nazis' reach.
169
from even purchasing paints or canvases. Id. at 13. By the end of the Hitler's cam-
paign, the Nazis confiscated nearly 16,000 works by degenerate artists from public col-
lections in Germany. Id. at 23.; see ROBERT ATKINS, ART SPOKE - A GUIDE TO MODERN
IDEAS, MOVEMENTS, AND BuzzwORDs, 1848-1944 146 (1993) (discussing various art move-
ments incorporated within Nazi art). Hitler's category of degenerate art included styles
from Impressionism to Expressionism. ATKINS, supra, at 146. Depictions of the poor
and bohemian lifestyles were examples of suppressible subjects. Id. Artists could only
paint scenes that "glorified the Nazi ideals of the Aryan superman and superwoman" in
a representational style. Id.; see also MERRYMAN & ELSEN, supra note 39, at 259 (explain-
ing Nazi confiscation and destruction of degenerate art). The Nazis did not prepare
any specific definition of degenerate art. MERRYMAN & ELSEN, supra, at 259. Certain
principles of what constituted degenerate art, however, could easily be recognized. Id.
Specifically, any works by Jewish artists or depictingJewish subjects, anti-war works, ex-
pressions of socialism or Marxism, works depicting people who the Nazis deemed infer-
ior, German Expressionism, and Abstract art were considered degenerate. Id. at 259-
60.
165. See NICHOLAS, supra note 14, at 11 (describing artwork Hitler found appeal-
ing). Hitler wanted idealistic artwork without any modern expressive elements. Id.; see
alsoJEANETrE GREENFIELD, THE RETURN OF CULTURAL TREASURES 234 (1989) (discussing
destruction of cultural property during World War II). Hitler had a plan to build a
model city and giant art museum in Linz, Austria. GREENFIELD, supra, at 234. If built,
the city and museum would have symbolized the glory of the Nazis. Id. After the end of
the war, the Allies discovered thousands of treasured cultural objects hidden in man-
sions, castles, and even salt mines. Id.
166. See NICHOLAS, supra note 14, at 65 (stating "[t]he ruins of Warsaw were still
smoking when the SS and other Nazi agencies and individuals began zealously carrying
out Hitler's exhortation to 'eliminate' Polish culture"). Hitler soon realized that the
overflow of confiscated cultural property had to be dealt with in a more systematic
fashion. Id. at 44. In the early summer of 1939, Hider appointed Hans Posse in charge
of the operation. Id. The task was already so monumental by 1939 that Posse's subordi-
nates had to be divided into specific curatorial positions, for example, armor, coins, or
books, in order to organize the stockpile of cultural property already in Nazi possession.
Id. at 45.
167. See DuBOFF, DESKBOOK, supra note 3, at D-17 (describing Nazis' plunder dur-
ing World War II). The Einsatzstab Rosenberg was the official department whose pur-
pose included assembling and disposing of the cultural property that met Hitler's re-
quirements. Id.
168. See NICHOLAS, supra note 14, at 41-44 (discussing Hider's super museum
plan). While the stacks of confiscated cultural objects began to stockpile, Hider had
sketches drawn for his super museum and various other buildings he planned to build
in Linz. Id. The plans for Hitler's super museum quickly expanded from a museum
dedicated solely to nineteenth-century German art to an enormous arrangement of sev-
eral museums each dedicated to a different discipline. Id. at 45.
169. Id. at 38-44. The Nazis forced both the wealthy and the poor to flee. Id. at
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In 1941, the Nazi occupation moved from France to Rus-
sia,170 and continued seizing and destroying cultural treasures as
it went from country to country. 171 In efforts to protect their
cultural property from looting by the Germans, major museums'
curatorial staffs carefully wrapped their cultural objects and
moved them to safer storage houses.1 72  In 1945, the Allied
forces173 halted Hitler's crusade to conquer the world. 174  De-
spite the fact that the Allies found, and eventually returned,
much of the Nazi confiscated cultural property, thousands of
cultural objects remained lost until recently.1 75
2. Russian Display of Looted Cultural Property
Although the Allied forces returned a portion of the cul-
tural objects seized by the Nazis, 176 many important works were
38-39. In their haste to save their own lives, those fleeing abandoned their valuable
objects. Id The Nazis were open about the seizure of private cultural property, and
required the rightful owners to follow the legal formalities implemented by the Nazis
for the expropriation of their property. Id. at 39.
170. See Susan H. Rothstein, All's Not Fair for Art in War: A Proposal for the Equitable
Exchange of Soviet and German Art Pillaged in World War 11,4 DEPAULJ. ART & ENT. LAw 35,
36 (1993) (discussing German and Russian confiscation of cultural property during
World War II). Germany invaded Russia in June of 1941 with no formal declaration of
war. Id.
.1.. 171. See NICHOLAS, supra note 14, at 185-20 (noting that when Russian army re-
turned to recently Nazi occupied territories they found nothing of value left). The
Nazis burned, looted, or otherwise destroyed nearly every building and cultural object.
Id. at 200. See generally Sylvia L. Depta, Twice Saved or Twice Stolen?: The Trophy Art Tug-of-
War Between Russia and Germany, 10 TEMP. INT'L & CoMp. LJ. 371, 373-76 (describing
Nazi's plunders of cultural property across Europe).
172. See NICHOLAS, supra note 14,. at 188 (stating "the Russian museums had, like
all others in Europe, long since ranked their objects and prepared packing materials").
The French began planning evacuation routes for their cultural objects as early as 1937.
Id. at 50-51. British museums also began planning the removal of their cultural objects
to remote parts of the country by 1938. Id. at 51. If cultural objects were too fragile to
be moved then the museum's curatorial staff built protective structures in the existing
museum galleries. Id.
173. See GRUN, supra note 6, at 516-18, 522-24 (noting that in 1941, Allies included
France, Britain, Russian, and United States).
174. See NICHOLAS, supra note 14, at 273-326 (detailing Nazis defeat by Allied
forces). The Allies final successful efforts at defeating the German army came at the
end of 1944 when the Allies finally took over Northern Europe. Id. at 321-22.
175. See Wallach, supra note 158, at B4 (explaining how Russia secretly kept more
than 500,000 stolen cultural objects); see also Carol J. Williams, 'Cold of Troy' at Heart of
Controversy, LA TIMES, Apr. 16, 1996, at F1, F9 (explaining that only two years ago
Russian authorities admitted possessing fabled "Gold of Troy" artifacts).
176. See Dan Fesperman, Tracking Down the Spoils of War, BALTIMORE SUN, Nov. 16,
1995, at 1E, 8E (discussing how "monuments officers" employed by British and U.S.
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lost and believed to have been destroyed. 17 7 Then, in 1991,
when Russian President Boris Yeltsin visited Germany, he con-
firmed the art world's suspicion that the Russian Government
possessed cultural property taken immediately after the end of
World War 11.178 Shortly thereafter two major Russian museums
confessed that they possessed secret collections of cultural ob-
jects. 179 The rumor circulated that, at the end of World War II,
the Russian army confiscated planes full of the Nazi's stolen art-
work previously thought to have been destroyed.8 °
Ultimately, in January of 1995, the Russian Government
confirmed the rumor that it had confiscated cultural objects
partly as revenge, and partly as restitution, for the destruction of
Russian cultural property during the Nazi invasion of Russia.1 8 1
In that same year, the Hermitage Museum opened an exhibition
entitled "Hidden Treasures Revealed"8 2 and the Pushkin Mu-
seum showed a similar exhibition entitled "Twice Saved." 8 3 The
following year the Pushkin Museum revealed another exhibit ti-
forces aided in return of stolen artwork). The Russians refused to return stolen cultural
property after World War II ended. Hughes, supra note 162, at 66 (explaining Allies
attempt at immediate restoration of stolen cultural objects to their rightful owners).
177. See Suzanne Muchnic, Art: On the Trail of Spoils of War, LA. TIMES, June 4,
1995, at Calendar 10, Calendar 53 (explaining recent realization that Russians actually
possessed artwork long thought destroyed).
178. See Rothstein, supra note 170, at 38-39 (discussing Russia's acknowledgment
of possession of cultural property taken after World War II). President Yeltsin's actions
confirmed the Russians' commitment to a 1990 German-Soviet Friendship Treaty call-
ing for the return of stolen or missing cultural property. Id. at 39; see also Treaty on
Good-Neighborliness, Parmership and Cooperation, Nov. 9, 1990, F.R.G.-U.S.S.R., art.
16, 30 I.L.M. 504, 512 [hereinafter German-Russian Cooperative Treaty] (stating coun-
tries' intentions to return cultural property to its original owners).
179. See Wallach, supra note 158, at B4 (discussing looted art on exhibit at Hermit-
age Museum). In 1991, the Soviet Union dissolved, creating chaos in a country which
had routinely kept secrets for decades. Id.
180. Id. The Soviet army had trophy brigades. Id. Trophy brigrades were divi-
sions of the Soviet army whose sole purpose was to capture artwork from German muse-
ums and bunkers and return it to Russia. Id.
181. Russia's Stolen Art, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 28, 1995, at 10. The Russian Govern-
ment only recently confirmed that it was in possession of cultural property originally
taken by the Nazis during World War II. Id. The Russian Ministry of Culture admitted
that Russia possessed the cultural property since the end of World War II. Id. Most of
the cultural property was about to be displayed at the Pushkin Museum in Moscow. Id.
182. See ALBERT KOSTENEVICH, HIDDEN TRE.SURS REVEALED - IMPRESSIONIST MAS-
TERPIECES AND OTHER IMPORTANT FRENCH PAINTINGS PRESERVED BY THE STATE HERMITAGE
MUSEUM, ST. PETERSBURG 7 (1995) (cataloguing previously hidden works that were
thought destroyed since World War II).
183. See Gambrell, supra note 29, at 88, 93-94 (discussing fate of art taken by Rus-
sian Government after World War II).
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fled "Gold of Troy." '184
The revelation that the Russian Government confiscated
and hid thousands of stolen cultural objects resulted in chaos
throughout the art world.18 5 European nations are demanding
that the Russian Government return their national treasures.1 86
Private individuals who lost cherished cultural objects as a result
of World War II are also looking to the Russian exhibits to deter-
mine if any of their heirlooms are involved. 187
B. Arguments
Although the German and Russian Governments began ne-
gotiations in 1990 to return the cultural property to its rightful
owners,188 these discussions recently stalled.189 One of the main
problems in resolving the situation is that the Russian's stolen
184. See Williams, supra note 175, at F1 (explaining controversy with Pushkin Mu-
seum's exhibit). The problems with the ownership controversy surrounding the "Gold
of Troy" exhibit are extremely complex. Id. The German archaeologist who discovered
the ancient treasure, Heinrich Schliemann, promised some of the objects to Greece,
Russia, England, France, and the United States, but in 1881 gave the most valuable
items to Germany. Id.
185. See Alexandra Peers, Spoils of War: Cries For Return of Booty Unnerve the World of
Art, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Feb. 21, 1995, at 11 (explaining that possibility of lawsuits over
artwork purchased some fifty years ago has museums, dealers, and private individuals
deeply concerned).
186. Id. Despite the fact that taking war booty is specifically prohibited by the
Hague Conventions of 1907 and 1954, Americans and Russians alike are guilty of major
World War II thefts. Id.
187. See Richard Beeston, War Booty Row Over Russian Exhibition, TIMES OF LONDON,
Mar. 30, 1995 (explaining that daughter of German art collector is claiming that art-
work displayed at Hermitage Museum is actually part of her father's stolen art collec-
tion).
188. See Gambrell, supra note 29, at 88, 93 (discussing possibilities for solution to
problem of where art taken during World War II should remain). In 1992, Russia and
Germany formed a committee to investigate claims from both Russia and Germany. Id.
at 90.; see also German-Russian Cooperative Treaty, supra note 178, art. 16, 30 I.L.M. at
512 (stating that both Russian and German Governments agree to return any cultural
property illegally taken to its territory).
189. See Gambrell, supra note 29, at 88, 90 (examining reasons why negotiations
between Russian and German Governments stalled). One of the reasons for the stalling
of the negotiations was Russia's refusal to reveal war archives which also included details
of other Russian wartime activities. Id. The Russian Government presently contends
that much of the works were removed legally and therefore are not subject to the
Hague Convention's rules. Id. at 90-91; see Christopher Knight, Displaying the Spoils of
War, LA. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1995, at Al, All (describing further complications of settle-
ment situations which could result after Russia's Parliament passes pending legislation
giving Russian Parliament and not Russian President jurisdiction to nationalize trophy
art).
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cultural objects fall into many different categories of original
ownership.19 This variety of ownership claims makes the task of
sorting out the rightful owners formidable. 191 Until the Russian
and German Governments reach a solution, the cultural objects
will remain in limbo, waiting in Russian museums for news of a
consensus indicating in whose possession they will remain. 19 2
1. The Russian Government's Arguments to Keep
Cultural Property
The Russian Government has several arguments supporting
its retention of the stolen cultural property.1 93 In general, it is
difficult to argue with the, Russian Government, whose country
the Nazis' occupation so clearly devastated. 194 Furthermore, the
Russian Government claims that there is no reason to return the
cultural objects because it is displaying and preserving them
properly.1 95
190. See Gambrell, supra note 29, at 88, 93-94 (discussing complexity of situation
between Russia and Germany). A variety of possessors originally owned Russia's looted
cultural property, including German museums, private German citizens, and countries
such as Holland and Hungary. Id. at 93. The Nazis purchased some of the cultural
objects legally. Id. at 93-94. The Nazis confiscated some of the cultural objects from
Jewish families by force. Id. at 94. Some of the cultural objects have living heirs. Id.
There are also some cultural objects whose origin is unknown to this day. Id. One
problem the International Court ofJustice is likely to come across if it is asked to settle
this World War II dispute is the problem of necessary third parties not before the court.
S. Shawn Stephens, The Hermitage and Pushkin Exhibits: An Analysis of the Ownership Rights
to Cultural Properties Removed From Occupied Germany, 18 Hous. J. INT'L L. 59, 66 (1995)
(explaining preliminary objections to referring Russia and Germany dispute, regarding
ownership of cultural property stolen during World War II, to International Court of
Justice).
191. See Gambrell, supra note 29, at 88, 93-94 (describing fears of Russian Govern-
ment). Russian Government officials are fearful that any negotiations with individual
German families would lead to an onslaught of lawsuits against the Russian Govern-
ment. Id. There is also the possibility that any return of the cultural property could
create a precedent that would create turmoil in the art world by leaving museum collec-
tions highly vulnerable to suit. Id.
192. See Stephens, supra note 190, at 110 (explaining complications of possible
resolution to conflict between Russia and Germany).
193. See id. at 61 (summarizing Russia's position as to which country should possess
World War II cultural property).
194. See id. at 109 (explaining that principle of equity favors objects remaining in
Russia); see also Rosemary Yardley, Who Owns the Art Loot?, GREENSBORO NEWS & REc.,
Mar. 31, 1995, at All (explaining why Russians have deeper reasons for wanting art
objects to remain in their country).
195. Stephens, supra note 190, at 107-08. The Russians argue that because they
rescued and preserved the art objects from Germany when it could not adequately care
for or return the objects, Germany's present claim for return based on cultural nation-
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a. The Russian Government's Taking of Cultural Objects After
World War II Was Lawful
One theory supporting the Russian Government's contin-
ued ownership of the cultural objects is that the Russian Govern-
ment acted properly in taking the cultural objects from occupied
German territory.1 96 The Russian Government maintains that it
lawfully obtained the cultural objects after World War II, accord-
ing to the Act of State Doctrine,'9 7 because the Russian Govern-
ment was, for all intents and purposes, the legal German Gov-
ernment when it took the cultural objects. 98 This Act of State
Doctrine argument is often applied in situations where property
is taken by a foreign sovereign government. 99
Several U.S. cases reflect the use of the Act of State Doc-
trine.20 0 Menzel v. List201 provides an example of a court's rea-
alism is unfounded. Id. Not only would the return threaten the future care and preser-
vation of the objects, but also it likely would result in the complete dispersal of the
objects. Id.; but cf Knight, supra note 189, at Al (discussing Hermitage Museum's ex-
hibit of art taken during World War II). The Hague Convention of 1954, which essen-
tially restated the Hague Convention of 1907 to which Russia and Germany are both
signatories, explicitly forbids the taking of war booty from occupied territories. Knight,
supra, at A1O.
196. See Stephens, supra note 190, at 93-99 (discussing argument of Russia's sover-
eignty over Germany). After the Allied defeat of Germany the Allies, specifically Russia,
became the state successors to the occupied German territory. Id. at 9-94.
197. See MERRYMAN & ELSEN, supra note 39, at 25-26 (discussing application of Act
of State Doctrine to protection of cultural property). The Act of State Doctrine re-
quires a jurisdiction to enforce a foreign sovereign's actions regardless of whether or
not the actions were valid under the jurisdiction's laws. Id. at 26.
198. See Gambrell, supra note 29, at 88, 90-91 (explaining Russian Government's
reasons for keeping stolen cultural property during World War II). The Russian Gov-
ernment claims that anything taken to Russia by order of the Russian military from an
occupied zone was removed legally because the Russian military was the legal German
Government at the time. Id.
199. See MERRvMAN & ELSEN, supra note 39, at 26 (describing use of Act of State
Doctrine). The Act of State Doctrine applies when "[t] he foreign government is recog-
nized by the United states at the time of the lawsuit and ... when the taking of the
property occurred within the foreign sovereign's own territorial boundaries." Id.
200. See id. at 25-28 (discussing reasoning and application of Act of State Doc-
trine). The general concept of the Act of State Doctrine is predicated on principles of
equality and independence of states concerning matters of international law. Id.
201. 49 Misc. 2d 300, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966). In Menzel v. List, the
plaintiff, Erna Menzel, and her deceased husband abandoned a Marc Chagall painting
while fleeing Belgium during World War II. Id., 49 Misc. 2d at 301, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 806.
The couple returned several years later to find their painting missing. Id., 49 Misc. 2d
at 301, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 807. The Chagall painting eventually surfaced in the hands of a
New York art dealer, Albert A. List. Id. Erna Menzel sued to recover her lost painting
from Mr. List. Id., 49 Misc. 2d at 301, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 806.
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soning regarding why the Act of State Doctrine would not ap-
ply.212 The court held that in Menzel the plaintiff was the sole
owner of a Chagall painting because the Nazis were not a foreign
sovereign recognized by the United States at the time they took
the Chagall painting.20 3 The court also held that the confisca-
tion did not occur within the territorial limits of the German
Government. 20 4 Therefore, the seizure was ruled an unlawful
pillage and the painting was ordered to be returned to the plain-
tiff.
20 5
b. Russia's Taking of Cultural Objects Was a
Legitimate Reprisal
Some scholars also believe that the Russian Government
took cultural property as reparations for the Russian losses at
the hands of the Nazis.2 °6 At the close of World War II, several
countries involved in the war suggested that the German Gov-
ernment should be forced to reimburse other countries for the
destruction of their cultural property using Germany's own cul-
tural property. 0 7 Today, many Russians adamantly voice this
202. See Menzel, 49 Misc. 2d at 308, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 813 (citing Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964)). The New York court used the Sabbatino
Court's analysis to determine whether of the Act of State Doctrine applies. Id. The
four factors include "(A) the taking must be by a foreign sovereign government; (B) the
taking must be within the territorial limitations of that government; (C) the foreign
government must be extant and recognized by this country at the time of suit; (D) the
taking must not be violative of a treaty obligation." Id.
203. Menzel, 49 Misc. 2d at 311, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 815.
204. Menzel, 49 Misc. 2d at 311, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 815-16. The Court held that mili-
tary occupation of a territory does not, in and of itself, indicate that the occupying party
is a sovereign. Id., 49 Misc. 2d at 311, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 816. Specifically, the Court found
that the government of Belgium continued to exist despite its exiled status during
World War II. Id., 49 Misc. 2d at 311, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 815.
205. See Menzel, 49 Misc. at 316, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 820 (holding that Nazi plundering
and pillaging of Chagall painting did not convey valid title to subsequent purchasers);
cf Stroganoff-Scherbatoff v. Welon, 420 F. Supp. 18, 22 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (holding that Act
of State Doctrine applied because Russian Army appropriated works pursuant to gov-
ernmental decree and U.S. Government recognized Russian Government).
206. See Lewis, supra note 28, at D5 (discussing discovery and debate surrounding
Russia's possession of cultural objects taken during World War II). Russian nationalists
argue that there is nothing to debate because the art objects are rightfully theirs. Id.; see
also Stephens, supra note 190, at 98 (stating that Russian ownership of World War II
cultural property is justified because cultural objects were taken as war reparations).
207. See MERRYMAN & EISEN, supra note 39, at 40 (discussing reparations in context
of World War II). The Russian Government claims that the Allied Control Council gave
Russia permission to take cultural reparations from Germany shortly after World War II
ended. AKINSHA AND KoZLOV, supra note 9, at 253-54 (discussing disagreement between
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view in support of the Russian Government retaining control of
the cultural objects in question. °8
c. Return of Cultural Objects Is Improper
Proponents for keeping the cultural property under Russian
control also base their arguments on the cultural destruction
that the German army unleashed on Russia during its siege °9 as
well as the Nazis' general plunder of cultural property in other
conquered nations. 21° Many Russians feel that the cultural prop-
erty taken after World War II is rightfully theirs as the victors of
the war. l l In addition, according to many Russians, their coun-
try's proper care for, and display of, the cultural objects in dis-
pute for an international audience indicates that the Russian
Government is the rightful owner.2 12
Russia and Germany as to whether cultural objects from World War II were taken un-
lawfully by Russia or were taken as legal reparations). The Russian Government pre-
pared a legal document in 1994 explaining Russia's position on the conflict as to owner-
ship of the cultural property. Id. at 253. This document states that directly after World
War II ended, countries looted by the Nazis during World War II retained the right to
take German cultural property as compensation. Id.
208. See Gambrell, supra note 29, at 88, 90 (discussing problems of Russia's posses-
sion and display of art). At "The Spoils of War" symposium, held in 1995 at the Bard
Graduate Center for Decorative Arts, Irina Antonova, Director of the Pushkin Museum,
gave a passionate speech in which she espoused exactly this rationale. Id.
209. See NicHot.As, supra note 14, at 185 (explaining Hitler's instructions of annihi-
lation for Russia's invasion). The basic tactics of the Nazis were similar to those applied
in Poland, however, in Russia the Nazis "did not bother with velvet gloves." Id. Hitler
wanted Russia completely devastated culturally, racially, and ideologically. Id. When
the Nazis reached Leningrad, the soldiers plundered whatever they possibly could. Id.
at 192. Lynn Nicholas explains how:
[m]irrors were smashed or machine-gunned, brocades and silks ripped from
the walls. At Peterhof, just outside Leningrad, the machinery controlling the
famous cascading fountains was destroyed, and the gilded bronze statues of
Neptune and Samson upon which the waters played were hauled off to the
smelting furnace in full view of the distraught townspeople.
Id.
210. See Stephens, supra note 190, at 109 (discussing Nazis' unethical efforts to
acquire cultural property).
211. See Knight, supra note 189, at A10 (explaining Russian Government's argu-
ments in favor of retaining possession of cultural property). Although international law
does not allow emotional reasoning as a basis for pillaging cultural property, Russian
citizens are having a hard time comprehending why they should be forced to relinquish
cultural property that they believe is rightfully theirs. Id.
212. See Stephens, supra note 190, at 105-08 (explaining cultural property taken by
Russians after World War II is part of mankind's cultural heritage). Russia preserved
and cared for the cultural objects after World War II when Germany did not have the
same ability. Id. at 107. Furthermore, the present Russian museum exhibits of the
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2. The German Government's Arguments for Return of
Cultural Property
The German Government is opposed to the Russian Gov-
ernment retaining cultural objects originally taken during World
War 11.213 Their arguments are grounded in the general interna-
tional prohibition of pillaging.214 The German Government also
argues that allowing the cultural objects to remain in Russia is
inequitable. 15
a. The Russian Army's Removal of Cultural Objects From
Germany After World War II Was Unlawful
One reason that the Russian Government should return the
cultural property to the German Government is the interna-
tional law that does not allow pillaging.216 The Act of State Doc-
trine does not apply to the Russia Army's actions because the
Russian occupation of German territory after World War II did
not eliminate the German Government's status as a sovereign
government.21 7  Furthermore, the doctrine of prescription 211
cultural property fulfill Russia's obligations to the international community to allow as
many people as possible access to the cultural property. Id.; but see Lisa Dickey, Looking
After the Treasure, RussIAN Lira, July 1, 1996, at 18, 20-21 (detailing poor condition of
Russian museums and lack of public funds available to restore and maintain facilities
adequately).
213. See Stephens, supra note 190, at 68 (discussing German Government's argu-
ments for return of cultural property to Germany).
214. See Gambrell, supra note 29, at 88, 90 (explaining German viewpoint that in-
ternational law requires Russia return stolen cultural objects).
215. See Stephens, supra note 190, at 89-91 (describing German Government's ar-
gument that allowing Russian Government to retain stolen cultural property would be
unfair).
216. See Gambrell, supra note 29, at 88, 90 (explaining German Government's re-
sponse to recent Russian decree that cultural property should be kept as war repara-
tions); see also Stephens, supra note 190, at 70-71 (stating Germany's argument that
Russia's actions violated international law because taking sovereign government's prop-
erty is only allowed in certain exceptions such as when conquerors take property from
defeated nation to prosecute war effort).
217. See Stephens, supra note 190, at 68 (discussing Germany's position on return
of cultural objects taken by Russia). Even if some executive powers are legitimately
exercised by an occupying government, once a legitimate government regains power all
of the legitimate government's property must be returned. Id. at 71-72.
218. See BLAcK's LAw DicloN~ARY 1183 (6th ed. 1990) (defining international law
of prescription as "[a] cquisition of sovereignty over a territory through continuous and
undisputed exercise of sovereignty over it during such a period as is necessary to create
... the general conviction that the present condition of things is in conformity with
international order").
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does not apply because once the German Government learned
that the Russian Government possessed the cultural property,
the German Government initiated discussions between the two
governments in an attempt to rectify the situation.219
b. It Is Inequitable for Cultural Objects to Remain in Russia
Another possible German argument in favor of returning
the cultural property is based on the concept of cultural nation-
alism.22 ° Specifically, the cultural nationalism argument is that
whenever possible, cultural property should be returned to its
country of origin.22 1 Therefore German nationalists argue that
because their government presently has the ability to care for
the contested cultural property properly, the Russian Govern-
ment must return the cultural objects to Germany.222
3. Third Party Arguments
Other nations22 3 and individual citizens2 24 who recognize
219. See Depta, supra note 171, at 386 (discussing Germany's and Russia's bilateral
agreements concerning cultural property); see also Stephens, supra note 190, at 80-83
(explaining that recent bilateral agreements between Russia and Germany require re-
turn of contested cultural property).
220. See MEYER, supra note 105, at 180-87 (discussing history of nationalist views of
cultural property and its link to Lord Byron); see a/soJohn Henry Merryman, Two Ways
of Thinking About Cultural Property, 80 Am.J. Iwr'L L. 831, 845-48 (1986) (distinguishing
cultural nationalism from cultural internationalism). A cultural nationalist generally
believes that any cultural property that is not in its source country should be returned
to that source country. Merryman, supra, at 845. The UNESCO Convention represents
this idea of cultural nationalism with the term "repatriation". Id.
221. See Merryman, supra note 220, at 845 (describing widespread acceptance of
cultural nationalism). Cultural nationalism predominates the international view to-
wards protection of cultural property. Id. at 846; see Forbes, supra note 2, at 241-43
(discussing differing perspectives on protection of cultural property).
222. See Stephens, supra note 190, at 90 (stating argument that Russia must return
cultural objects based on principles of equity). The Russian Government has a duty to
return the cultural objects to Germany because the cultural objects are a part of Ger-
many's cultural heritage and Germany has the resources to protect and preserve these
cultural objects. Id. Germans have a right to protect and enjoy their national cultural
heritage. Id. at 89-90.
223. See Gregory Katz, DALLAs MORNING NEWS, Mar. 28, 1995, at 1A, 9A (describing
reaction to Russia's recent unveiling of stolen cultural objects). The French and Dutch
are pressuring the Russians to uphold their agreement with Germany that forces Russia
to return the cultural property taken during World War II. Id.
224. See Beeston, supra note 187 (noting individual's reactions to seeing family's
cultural property appear at opening of exhibit at Hermitage Museum). Daniela
Brabner-Smith, a daughter of a private German art collector, claimed that two of the
eleven masterpieces stolen from her family's house were on exhibit at the Hermitage
1998 FORDHAMINTERVATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 20:1961
some of the works displayed in the Russian museums as their
own argue that military occupation and seizure does not elimi-
nate an original owner's title to a cultural object.22 5 These
outside groups have diverse histories and legal issues.226 Gener-
ally, however, before any of the cultural property is returned to
Germany these outside groups should be given an opportunity
to intervene. 227
4. Proposal to Resolve This Problem in the International
Court of Justice
One scholar argues that the parties should resolve the ques-
tion of ownership of the cultural property taken during World
War II by using the International Court ofJustice 22 8 ("ICJ") for a
few reasons.2 2 9 First, negotiations between the Russian and Ger-
man Governments have stalled.230 In addition, the dispute in-
volves two parties both of whom would like the question of own-
ership settled.23 1 Also, the ICJ's ability to use experts to settle
complex disputes such as the present debate over ownership of
cultural property, makes it adept at creating an equitable solu-
tion to the problem.212
Museum in Russia. Id. Grandsons of the collector Otto Gerstenberg claim ownership
of the Degas painting on exhibit. James Meek & Sarah Jane Checkland, Who Keeps the
Spoils of War?, THE GUARDtAN, Feb. 11, 1995, at 023 (discussing recent Russian exhibi-
tion of trophy art).
225. See Rothstein, supra note 170, at 46 (discussing private actions for recovery of
cultural property taken during World War II); see also Menzel v. List, 49 Misc. 2d 300,
311, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804, 816 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966) (explaining that Nazis' military occupa-
tion of Belgium did not eliminate plaintiff's title to painting).
226. See Borodkin, supra note 21, at 399-405 (discussing problems with legal pro-
tections when stolen cultural property problems reach international levels).
227. See Stephens, supra note 190, at 65-67 (explaining preliminary objections that
must be settled before Russian and German conflict in ownership of cultural property
can be brought before International Court ofJustice [hereinafter ICJ]).
228. U.N. CHARTER art. 92 (stating that ICJ "shall be the principal judicial organ of
the United Nations").
229. See Stephens, supra note 190, at 110-12 (describing ICJ as ideal method for
settlement of dispute between Russia and Germany).
230. See id. at 60-61 (explaining that failure of Russian and German Governments
to reach independent consensus as to ownership of cultural objects creates situation
applicable for ICJ); see also Amei Wallach, Russia, Art and Spoils of War, NEWSDAY, Jan. 24,
1995, at B7, B9 (stating Irina Antonova's, director of Moscow's Pushkin Museum, opin-
ion that cultural property from World War II is Russia's and Russia's position on subject
is not negotiable).
231. See Stephens, supra note 190, at 110 (describing Russia and Germany as two
parties who would like dispute in ownership settled).
232. Id. at 111-12. There are various factors to the situation between Russia and
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III. THE ICJ SHOULD USE THE UNIDROIT CONVENTION AS
A GUIDE TO COMPEL THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT
TO RETURN THE CULTURAL PROPERTY
STOLEN DURING WORLD WAR II
TO GERMANY
The ICJ is the appropriate forum for resolving the dispute
in ownership between Russia and Germany."' 3 The ICJ should
take advantage of the UNIDROIT Convention and apply it as a
guide to settle the dispute. 23 4 The UNIDROIT Convention does
not directly apply to the disagreement between the Russian and
German Governments regarding ownership of the cultural prop-
erty stolen during and directly after World War II, but the
UNIDROIT Convention would serve as a useful guide to resolve
the conflict.235
A. The Russian and German Governments Should Use the ICJ to
Return the Stolen Cultural Objects to Their Rightful Owners
The ICJ is designed to settle exactly this sort of ownership
dispute. 23 6  The Russian and German Governments agreed,
under the provisions of the 1990 German-Russian Cooperative
Treaty, 37 that both countries would return any cultural objects
in their possession originating from either forced sales or pil-
lages, but there has been little action to that effect.2 38 The result
Germany which make the ICJ a likely vehicle to find a solution. Id. The ability of the
ICJ to use experts increases the likelihood that the Court could resolve Russia's and
Germany's conflict over ownership of the stolen cultural objects. Id. The ICJ would be
able to use experts to trace the complex chains of ownership of the cultural objects in
question. Id.
233. See supra notes 229-32 and accompanying text (explaining one scholar's pro-
posal for Russia and Germany to use ICJ to settle dispute regarding ownership of stolen
cultural property).
234. See supra notes 135-39 and accompanying text (discussing scope of
UNIDROIT Convention).
235. Id.
236. See supra notes 230-32 and accompanying text (examining arguments for tak-
ing situation between Russian and German Governments to iCJ).
237. See supra note 178 and accompanying text (discussing Russian and German
Governments' attempts at reaching a solution to dispute in ownership of cultural prop-
erty stolen during World War II).
238. See supra notes 178-85 and accompanying text (describing revelation of Rus-
sia's possession of looted cultural property from World War II and lack of resolution as
to question of which country is rightful owner of looted cultural property); supra notes
189-92 and accompanying text (examining lack of advancement in efforts to resolve
conflict in ownership of looted cultural property).
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is a situation that appears impossible to settle voluntarily. From
the Hague Convention of 1954 to the UNESCO Convention of
1970, and most recently to the UNIDROIT Convention of 1995,
the clear trend is toward protecting cultural property in its coun-
try of origination and this policy should apply to the Russian and
German Governments' dispute.23 9
B. The ICJ Should Apply the UN1DROIT Convention as a Guide to
Returning the Stolen Cultural Property to its Original Owners
The UNIDROIT Convention should act as a guide to settle
the dispute in ownership of cultural property between the Rus-
sian and German Governments. 240 A main purpose underlying
the formation of the UNIDROIT Convention involved clearing
up some of the confusing problems as to who has the burden of
proving ownership of stolen cultural property.2 41 The secrecy of
the Russian Government,24 2 combined with the passage of over
fifty years since the end of World War I1,243 and the irreplaceable
nature of cultural property2 44 makes discovering exactly who the
art objects belong to a burdensome task.2 4 5
Article 3 of the UNIDROIT Convention bears immediate
relevance to the situation between Russia and Germany.246
When used as a guide, itjustifies the German Government's fifty
year-old claim for the return of the stolen cultural property. Ar-
ticle 3 sets a time limit for claims which depend upon the nature
239. See supra notes 83-88 and accompanying text (describing Hague Convention
as expansion of previous attempts at protecting cultural property); supra notes 100-106
and accompanying text (discussing advances of UNESCO Convention); supra notes 125-
28 and accompanying text (detailing advancements in international protection of cul-
tural property made by UNIDROIT Convention).
240. See supra notes 140-55 and accompanying text (explaining Articles 3 and 4 of
UNIDROIT Convention).
241. See id. (explaining UNIDROIT Convention's principles of return and com-
pensation).
242. See supra notes 218-20 and accompanying text (stating Germany's argument
that cultural property should not remain in Russia because Russian Government's se-
crecy prohibits application of doctrine of prescription).
243. Id.
244. See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text (detailing importance and uni-
queness of cultural property).
245. See supra notes 185-87 and accompanying text (discussing complicated owner-
ship questions involved in dispute between Russian and German Governments created
because of involvement of variety of third parties).
246. See supra notes 140-48 and accompanying text (detailing principle of return
as set forth in Article 3 of UNIDROIT Convention).
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of the theft and the nature of the stolen cultural object. Article
3 also allows a court to determine which dispossessed owner
should receive the stolen cultural objects when there are com-
peting claims for the same cultural object. The Russian Govern-
ment's concealment of the location of the valuable cultural ob-
jects, therefore, does not preclude the German Government
from requesting any object's return. 247 Indeed, the Russian Gov-
ernment's vehement denial of possession of stolen cultural prop-
erty supports the German Government's argument that a more
relaxed statute of limitations under Article 3 of the UNIDROIT
Convention applies to the situation.
2 48
Moreover, Article 4 of the UNIDROIT Convention would
aid in alleviating the staggering problem of calculating just com-
pensation for return of the artwork. The Russian Government
could argue, under the UNIDROIT Convention, that it confis-
cated the cultural objects with the good faith belief that the con-
fiscation was a legitimate reprisal for the Nazis' actions during
World War II, and thus the principle ofjust compensation found
in Article 4 would apply. However, the reality that the German
Government survived and thrived for over fifty years with the cul-
tural property hidden in Russia,249 combined with the realistic
costs associated with compensation for the cultural property's re-
turn, makes the decision of what monetary amount equals just
compensation a difficult task. 5° The additional possibility that
the Russian Government is still hiding countless cultural objects
makes the return of the fraction presently on display in Russian
museums a potential disaster to the art world and to the Russian
247. See Lewis, supra note 28, at Dl. The Soviets returned some of their spoils to
East Germany in 1953 and 1957. Id. They returned the Pergamon Altar and approxi-
mately five hundred paintings that originally resided in Germany. Id. When the Rus-
sians were questioned by their then ally, East Germany, about other possessions; how-
ever, the Russians denied possession of any other objects. Id.
248. See supra note 176-84 and accompanying text (explaining world's recent reve-
lation of Russian possession of cultural property looted during World War II); see also
supra note 219 and accompanying text (discussing German Government's immediate
attempts at settling dispute with Russian Government as to which country is rightful
owner of looted cultural objects as' soon as German Government became aware of cul-
tural objects stolen during World War II location in Russia).
249. See supra notes 176-82 and accompanying text (explaining how entire world
believed for over fifty years that World War II activities destroyed cultural property now
confirmed as remaining secretly within Russian Government's possession).
250. See supra notes 190-91 and accompanying text (discussing how ownership is-
sues become complicated because of quantity and diversity of works stolen).
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Government. The return of some cultural objects leaves the art
world in an infinite state of chaos and the Russian Government
open to the never ending threat of lawsuits.2
51
CONCLUSION
If the UNIDROIT Convention is applied to the dispute in
ownership between Russia and Germany, the Russian Govern-
ment would relinquish their possession of the cultural objects
stolen during World War II to the German Government.
Although this might seem unjust given the history of World War
II, the UNIDROIT Convention properly supports the modern
principle of returning cultural property to its original owners.
The German Government would then bear the burden of at-
tempting to return any of the stolen cultural property to its right-
ful owners. Additionally, the Russian Government would be en-
titled to receive just compensation for returning the stolen cul-
tural objects. Because of the large amount of German cultural
property in Russia, however, the German Government may be
required to pay huge sums for the return of the stolen objects. If
the German Government is required to compensate the Russian
Government for the true value of the cultural objects as opposed
to merely the cost of the return of the cultural objects, it is most
likely that the cost of the objects' return will be too high and the
stolen cultural objects will remain in Russia.
251. See supra note 185 and accompanying text (describing art world's fears of mas-
sive lawsuits over art long thought destroyed).
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